The role of intolerance of uncertainty in social anxiety: interpretation of ambiguous social information by Spiroiu, Flavia I.
Lakehead University
Knowledge Commons,http://knowledgecommons.lakeheadu.ca
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Electronic Theses and Dissertations from 2009
2018
The role of intolerance of uncertainty in








The Role of Intolerance of Uncertainty in Social Anxiety: Implications for the Interpretation of 
Ambiguous Social Information  
 
 
Flavia I. Spiroiu 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Master of Arts in Clinical Psychology 
Department of Psychology 
Lakehead University 
Thunder Bay, Ontario 





Primary Supervisor: Dr. Amanda Maranzan 
Second Reader: Dr. Rupert Klein  
External Examiner: Dr. Mirella Stroink





The existence of intolerance of uncertainty (IU) about ambiguous social information in 
individuals with social anxiety has only recently begun to be explored by researchers, whereas 
the cognitive mechanisms whereby IU might contribute to social anxiety have thus far not been 
empirically investigated. The purpose of this study was threefold: to examine whether IU 
contributes significant variance in social anxiety severity above and beyond that accounted for 
by fear of negative evaluation, anxiety sensitivity, and depression; to investigate whether social 
anxiety severity is associated with greater levels of IU and a greater tendency to interpret 
ambiguous social events negatively; and to examine whether fear of negative evaluation and 
negative interpretation bias mediate the relationship between IU and social anxiety. Two-
hundred and ten undergraduate students from Lakehead University completed part 1 (online) of 
the study and 66 participants from the initial sample completed part 2 (in-lab). Results indicated 
a significant relationship between IU and social anxiety independent of all other variables. IU 
was found to have an additive and specific effect on social anxiety severity, with increasing 
levels of uncertainty intolerance corresponding with more intensified symptoms of social 
anxiety. However, irrespective of anxiety severity level, participants with social anxiety made 
more negative interpretations of ambiguous social events than controls, entailing that this 
negative interpretation bias is a core cognitive appraisal process among these individuals. As 
expected, fear of negative evaluation mediated the association between IU and social interaction 
anxiety, as well as the relationship between IU and performance anxiety. Negative interpretations 
of ambiguous social information, however, only mediated the relationship between IU and social 
interaction anxiety. Limitations and implications of study findings are discussed from a 
theoretical, methodological, and clinical perspective.    
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The Role of Intolerance of Uncertainty in Social Anxiety: Implications for the Interpretation of 
Ambiguous Social Information  
The enduring nature of social anxiety, which is characterized by a persistent anxiety and 
apprehension related to scrutiny by others in interpersonal or performance situations, continues 
to puzzle researchers (Antony & Rowa, 2008). Individuals with high social anxiety exhibit a 
combination of cognitions (e.g., unrealistically high personal standards for social performance), 
physiological symptoms (e.g., sweating), and behaviors (e.g., avoidance of social situations), the 
interaction of which facilitates self-perpetuating cycles of debilitating fear and anxiety 
(American Psychological Association, 2013). Avoidance of feared interactions and performance 
situations has long been proposed as a possible explanation for the persisting nature of social 
anxiety (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009). That is, avoidance of exposure to a particular type of social 
interaction precludes an individual from discovering that their fears are unfounded and that their 
performance would be more acceptable than they anticipated. However, this explanation is not 
entirely adequate because most individuals with social anxiety are regularly exposed to at least 
some of the situations they are apprehensive of without gaining any insight that might disconfirm 
their fears. Indeed, this point is highlighted in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders V (DSM-V; APA, 2013), which specifies that social anxiety-inducing situations are 
“avoided or endured with intense fear or anxiety” (p. 202). An additional maintaining factor in 
the form of biased information processing has therefore been proposed by several cognitive 
theorists (Clark & Wells, 1995; Mellings & Alden, 2000).    
The following literature review will begin by examining the dominant cognitive model of 
social anxiety, including its hallmark features of negative interpretation bias—particularly with 
respect to ambiguous events—and fear of negative evaluation. Anxiety sensitivity, a fear of 




anxiety-related bodily sensations, will then be briefly discussed in terms of its association with 
negative evaluation and its overall role in the maintenance of social anxiety. The construct of 
intolerance of uncertainty will then be examined, and its contributory role in specific anxiety 
disorders will be reviewed. Finally, a novel cognitive pathway hypothesizing how intolerance of 
uncertainty engenders anxiety-maintaining negative interpretations of ambiguous information 
will be proposed. As an aside, it is worthwhile to note that, although the studies described in the 
literature review do not explicitly address issues related to the classification of social anxiety, 
most of the recent evidence appears to support a dimensional understanding of the condition as a 
phenomenon that exists on a continuum with normal behaviour rather than a categorically 
distinct manifestation of psychopathology (Huppert, Foa, Furr, Filip, & Mathews, 2003; Ruscio, 
2010).  
A Cognitive Model of Information Processing in Social Anxiety 
The Clark and Wells cognitive model was specifically developed to explain the 
underlying mechanisms of social anxiety and its persistence, with a focus on both the cognitive 
processing that occurs when an individual enters a feared social situation and processing 
occurring prior to and after leaving the social event (Clark, 2001). According to this model, 
individuals with social anxiety develop a set of distinct assumptions about themselves and their 
social environment on the basis of innate behavioral predispositions interacting with previous 
experiences. These assumptions are composed of excessively high standards for social 
performance (e.g., “I must always sound intelligent and fluent”), conditional beliefs concerning 
the consequences of performing in a certain way (e.g., “If I am quiet, people will think I am 
boring”), and unconditional negative beliefs about the self (e.g., “I’m unlikeable/unacceptable”) 
(Clark 2001, p. 406). Upon entering a feared social situation, the activation of these assumptions 




leads the individual to interpret the situation as dangerous, to expect a failure to meet their 
desired standards of performance, and to appraise innocuous or ambiguous social information as 
indicative of an unfavorable evaluation by others. Once this occurs, attention is shifted to 
thorough self-monitoring of interoceptive information, such as bodily sensations, distorted 
mental imagery detailing how the individual is viewed from an observer’s perspective, and a 
“felt sense” of appearing different or deficient to others (Mellings & Alden, 2000). The internal 
information obtained through self-monitoring is then used to generate a negative self-impression 
(Clark & McManus, 2002).   
An additional outcome of perceiving social situations as dangerous is engagement in 
safety behaviours, many of which are internal cognitive processes such as rehearsing extensively 
for a speech or memorizing a statement to be made during an upcoming social interaction (Clark, 
2001). A vast variety of other safety behaviors may be displayed in feared situations, including 
avoiding eye contact and pretending to take notes during a meeting in an attempt to look 
professional, wearing cosmetics to conceal blushing, or keeping topics of conversation away 
from “challenging” issues to prevent others from thinking one is stupid or incompetent (Clark & 
Wells, 1995). Such safety behaviours consequently increase self-focused attention and self-
monitoring while reducing attention to and processing of others’ objective behaviour, which in 
turn serves to maintain one’s negative self-image. Negative beliefs about safety behaviors are 
moreover reinforced because the non-occurrence of a feared situation is attributed to engagement 
in the respective behaviors (Clark & McManus, 2002). An unintended consequence of safety 
behaviors is that they may draw others’ attention to the individual with social anxiety and 
influence others’ behaviour in a way that confirms the fears and assumptions held by the socially 
anxious person (Clark & McManus, 2002). For instance, an individual whose attention is 




devoted to self-monitoring and memorizing can appear preoccupied and unreceptive, provoking 
in others an unfriendly or critical response that seemingly corroborates the negative assumptions. 
Entrance into the feared social situation is additionally accompanied by marked cognitive and 
somatic symptoms, such as sweating, shaking, trembling, blushing, mental blanks, and heart 
palpitations (Clark, 2001). The fact that these symptoms are interpreted as forecasting an 
impending catastrophe contributes to the individual’s hypervigilance for the symptoms, further 
increasing the subjective intensity of the arousal. Rather than serving any useful function, this 
constellation of cognitive, somatic, affective, and behavioural responses becomes a further 
source of perceived danger and contributes to a series of interlinked cycles that maintain or 
exacerbate social anxiety while precluding disconfirmation of negative assumptions and 
appraisals (Clark & Wells, 1995). 
Although considerable anxiety and negative self-processing occur during a feared social 
event, anticipatory anxiety and negative cognitions can be experienced well before entering the 
social situation as individuals conduct a detailed review of what they expect will happen 
(Mellings & Alden, 2000). As the dread and foreboding associated with the forthcoming event 
increases, individuals with social anxiety selectively retrieve recollections of past failures to 
fulfill their desired levels of performance, experience negative images of their social behavior 
during the event, and make predictions about deficient performance, negative evaluation, and 
social rejection. The result of these ruminations is that, upon ultimately participating in the event, 
the individual is already in a processing mode defined by heightened self-monitoring and 
evaluation, expectations of failure, and a reduced capacity to notice disconfirmatory evidence 
such as signs of approval from others (Clark, 2001).  




While post-event anxiety symptoms rapidly subside as the perceived social danger is 
removed, distorted information processing continues past the termination of the event (Clark, 
2001). Given that social situations are inherently ambiguous and it is unlikely for an individual 
with social anxiety to have received entirely unambiguous indications of social acceptance, 
thorough scrutiny of the interaction often follows the event. The salience of negative appraisals 
and somatic and cognitive symptoms during the social situation entails that these factors have 
been firmly encoded in memory and become the paramount focus of the individual’s 
examination (Mellings & Alden, 2000). Since the review is dominated by the individual’s 
negative self-impression and erroneous inferences about how they appear to others, they are 
likely to appraise their performance as much more negative than it truly was and to interpret 
social cues that are benign or neutral from an outside observer’s perspective as evidence of 
disapproval from others (Clark & Wells, 1995). The recent interaction and perceived social 
failure generated through this post-event processing is then added to the archive of past failures 
and serves to reinforce the individual’s belief in their social ineptitude.    
Interpretation of Ambiguous Social Information 
One of the central tenets of the model proposed by Clark and Wells is that people with 
social phobia display a tendency to interpret ambiguous social cues in a negative fashion. A 
growing body of literature has indeed provided support for this notion. Constans, Penn, Ihen, and 
Hope (1999) developed a vignette depicting a ‘blind’ date between two college-aged students in 
order to examine whether socially-anxious individuals display a negative interpretation bias 
towards ambiguous social information. The vignette, which contained a number of ambiguous 
statements and behaviours concerning both interpersonal evaluation and evaluation of non-
personal stimuli, was administered to socially anxious and nonanxious undergraduate students 




who were subsequently asked to complete a questionnaire designed to assess their interpretation 
of events that transpired in the story. Although the two groups did not differ on items measuring 
interpretations of non-personal events (e.g., Upon entering the restaurant, Lisa said “This is an 
unusual place.”), socially anxious participants generated significantly more negative 
interpretations of ambiguous, interpersonal events (e.g., When meeting her date, Lisa said 
“You're certainly not what I expected.”).  
Amir, Foa, and Coles (1998) investigated interpretive bias in patients with generalized 
social phobia (GSP) by examining whether these individuals have a tendency to select a negative 
interpretation of scenarios even when they are presented with an alternative positive explanation. 
Although not currently recognized in the DSM-V (APA; 2013), GSP was formerly 
acknowledged as a subtype of social phobia characterized by a chronic pattern of social fears that 
extends to most social situations and is more incapacitating than social phobia (APA, 1994; 
Hook & Valentiner, 2002). In order to assess the specificity of the interpretation bias for social 
scenarios, patients were presented with both self-relevant and other-relevant (i.e., related to a 
‘typical person’) social and non-social scenarios. Two comparison groups, namely non-anxious 
controls and individuals with obsessive compulsive disorder, were also included for this purpose. 
All participants were presented with ambiguous social events (e.g., Someone you are interested 
in dating says “Hello” to you.) and ambiguous non-social events (e.g., You receive a phone call 
from a clerk at your bank regarding your loan application.). Immediately after reading each 
scenario, patients were presented with a negative, a neutral, and a positive interpretation, and 
asked to rank order them with respect to their likelihood of coming into one’s own mind or the 
mind of a “typical person” in similar situations. The results revealed that, in comparison to 
patients with obsessive compulsive disorder and nonanxious controls, individuals with social 




phobia were more likely to make negative interpretations of ambiguous social events despite the 
availability of alternative positive interpretations. Moreover, the interpretive bias only occurred 
when they were presented with self-relevant social scenarios. 
Facial expression is an extremely important medium for conveying social evaluative 
information, entailing that the utilization of pictures depicting human faces may also be useful in 
research on disambiguation bias in social anxiety. Yoon and Zinbarg (2007) employed pictorial 
stimuli to examine whether high socially anxious undergraduate students have a tendency to 
interpret neutral facial expressions in a more threatening manner than students exhibiting low 
social anxiety. Participants were presented with stimulus picture sets of cue and target pictures 
depicting happy, angry, disgust, and neutral faces, and were instructed to press a response button 
as soon as they determined what facial expression was depicted in the picture. It was expected 
that targets consistent with the interpretation given to the preceding cue would be more primed 
and would consequently generate a faster response time than targets that were inconsistent with 
the previous cue. In other words, the participants’ responses were not used to determine the 
content of their interpretation but rather served as an index of their latency to establish an 
interpretation. The authors used neutral pictures as ambiguous social cues obtained from a 
previous investigation wherein the neutral pictures were interpreted in a variety of ways by 
different people, thereby warranting their classification as ambiguous. Following each target, a 
“Story” or “No Story” message was displayed that indicated whether the participant was required 
to compose a story linking together the two pictures in the preceding trial and describing how the 
people in the pictures were feeling. The story content and references to the affect portrayed in the 
pictures were then coded and analyzed for interpretation bias.  




The results revealed that high socially anxious participants interpreted the neutral pictures 
as threatening whereas participants with low levels of social anxiety tended to interpret the 
neutral pictures as neutral. These findings were corroborated by both the coded self-report stories 
and reaction time analyses indicating that socially anxious participants showed a relative 
speeding of processing angry targets following neutral cues. Yoon and Zinbarg (2008) confirmed 
and extended these findings in a subsequent study wherein they used an incidental learning 
paradigm to demonstrate that high socially anxious individuals interpret neutral social interaction 
cues in a threatening manner even in the absence of threat, whereas nonanxious persons make 
negative interpretations only when they are exposed to a threat manipulation. In sum, these 
results confirm the existence of an interpretation bias for ambiguous facial expressions in high 
socially anxious persons and extend the findings of previous investigations using verbal stimuli. 
While these studies provide compelling support for a negative interpretation bias in social 
anxiety, it is also important to employ more ecologically valid study designs that utilize 
ambiguous stimuli in the form of non-verbal, behavioral social cues in real life interactions rather 
than written vignettes or questionnaires. As such, an investigation was carried out to determine 
whether individuals with high levels of anxiety are more likely to make negative and threatening 
interpretations of other people’s ambiguous behavior than low socially anxious individuals. In 
this study, high and low socially anxious undergraduate students were asked to give a four 
minute anxiety-provoking speech to a confederate of the opposite sex who performed the 
following five ambiguous behaviors at various intervals: running fingers through hair, scratching 
head, crossing legs, propping chin in hand, and clearing throat (Kanai, Sasagawa, Chen, 
Shimada, & Sakano, 2009). Following the speech, participants were asked open-ended questions 
regarding their interpretations of the confederate’s behaviour, and each interpretation was 




independently categorized by two researchers as either negative, neutral, or unclassifiable. 
Furthermore, each negative interpretation was classified according to external threat, with threat 
being defined as “indicators of possible negative evaluation such as frowns, signs of boredom, 
etc.” (Kanai et al., p. 234). It was found that individuals with high social anxiety interpreted the 
ambiguous behaviours of other people in a more negative and threatening manner and in a less 
neutral manner than did nonanxious participants. Even after controlling for depression levels, 
high socially anxious participants were found to make more threatening interpretations of 
ambiguous behaviour than their nonanxious counterparts (Kanai et al., 2009).    
Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) have also helped to advance understanding of 
interpretation bias in social anxiety and have proven to be a superior “online” methodology for 
detecting the exact nature and time course of interpretive bias in view of their excellent temporal 
resolution (Moser, Huppert, Foa, & Simons, 2012). One of the more promising ERP candidates 
in research on interpretation bias is the P600 component, a positive deflection in brain electrical 
activity that reaches maximum amplitude roughly 600ms after stimulus onset in sentence 
processing tasks (Moser, Huppert, Foa, Hajcak, & Simons, 2008). It has been established that the 
P600 reflects violations in expectancy and that an enhanced P600 to expectancy violations 
signifies neural processes underlying the evaluation and reinterpretation of an unexpected 
stimulus. With this in mind, Moser et al. (2008) sought to examine interpretation bias for 
ambiguous social scenarios by recording P600 data from low-anxious and high-anxious 
participants while presenting them with a grammar decision task containing sentence stems and 
accompanying sentence-terminal words. All sentence stems were ambiguous until the final 
terminal word that resolved the ambiguity in either a positive or negative manner. For example, 
the sentence stem “As you give a speech, you see a person in the crowd smiling, which means 




that your speech is. . .” was resolved by either a negative (e.g., “stupid”) or a positive (e.g., 
“funny”) terminal word (p. 695).  
The results indicated that individuals with low anxiety exhibited P600s with greater 
amplitudes to negative than to positive terminal words of ambiguous sentence stems. In other 
words, the negative terminal words were relatively unexpected for these individuals, who 
demonstrated the presence of an online positive interpretation bias. In contrast, ERP data from 
high socially anxious individuals revealed no difference in P600 amplitude between positive and 
negative terminal words, suggesting the absence of a positive interpretation bias. Using a similar 
grammar decision task, Moser et al. (2012) later replicated these findings in an ERP investigation 
with individuals meeting diagnostic criteria for social phobia. The negative N400 component, 
which also displays larger amplitudes to violations of expectancy, similarly revealed a lack of 
positive interpretation bias and some suggestion of negative bias across all patients.   
Taken together, these findings provide strong evidence for the notion that individuals 
with social anxiety have a tendency to interpret ambiguous social events in a negative or 
threatening fashion. Although these studies have all established a relationship between negative 
interpretation bias and social anxiety, the mechanisms whereby this bias is evoked remain largely 
unknown. The construct of intolerance of uncertainty, which will be discussed later, may be 
particularly helpful in elucidating how this bias arises and leads to social anxiety.   
Fear of Negative Evaluation 
The core cognitive feature outlined by the cognitive model of social anxiety is a fear of 
negative evaluation that leads the individual to perceive social situations as inherently dangerous 
or threatening. Specifically, the interlinked cycles that maintain anxiety all commence with the 
individual’s assumption that the audience in a particular social situation is likely to evaluate them 




negatively and that such an evaluation will result in dire consequences (Clark, 2001). Since 
socially anxious individuals are highly apprehensive of being viewed in this manner, high in 
need for approval, and more concerned about making good impressions on others, one would 
expect to evidence a strong relationship between measures of negative evaluation apprehension 
and social anxiety.  
This hypothesis has been empirically confirmed time and time again over the years. In a 
study examining criteria for classification of phobias, Nichols (1974) discovered that the primary 
distinguishing characteristic of socially anxious individuals was sensitivity to and fearfulness of 
experiencing criticism, disapproval, and rejection. Similar results were found in an investigation 
of the psychometric properties of the original Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE) scale, wherein 
fear of negative evaluation was defined as “apprehension about others' evaluations, distress over 
their negative evaluations, avoidance of evaluative situations, and the expectation that others 
would evaluate oneself negatively” (Watson & Friend, 1969, p. 449). Compared to subjects 
classified as low in fear of negative evaluation and social avoidance, individuals high on fear of 
negative evaluation and social avoidance worked harder on a boring letter-number substitution 
task either if disapproval by their group leader was threatened or when they believed they would 
receive approval for their hard work from the group leader. These findings suggest that 
individuals who are high in fear of negative evaluation place more effort into both gaining 
approval from others and avoiding disapproval and criticism. 
 Further support for this hypothesis was provided by a study assessing the effects of social 
anxiety on perception of and responses to negatively toned interpersonal feedback (Smith & 
Sarason, 1975). Two-hundred and eleven college students were divided into low, moderate, and 
high social anxiety groups based on their responses to the FNE scale, and were subsequently 




asked to participate in an impression formation experiment wherein they interacted with another 
person who rated them on bipolar adjective scales (e.g., likable/unlikable). Participants in the 
high and moderate anxiety groups perceived the same feedback as being significantly more 
negative than individuals with low anxiety levels, and indicated that such feedback would evoke 
more negative personal feelings. Moreover, and importantly, highly anxious individuals reported 
a greater expectancy to receive such a negative evaluation than did subjects in the other groups.  
 Research has also shown that individuals exhibiting both high social anxiety and high 
fear of negative evaluation may present a bias towards detection of negative emotions in others. 
In a study investigating whether social anxiety is associated with enhanced processing of social 
threat cues, subjects scoring high and low on the FNE scale were asked to rate the type of 
emotion conveyed on slides and video clips both before and after a public speaking threat 
induction (Winton, Clark & Edelman, 1995). Subjects who scored high on fear of negative 
evaluation also scored higher than those with low fear of negative evaluation on measures of 
social anxiety and distress, and they were significantly more likely to rate the presented facial 
expressions as negative without having abstracted more affective information from the 
expressions. Thus, there appeared to be in these individuals an immediate bias towards 
interpretation of emotional expressions as negative in the absence of any enhanced ability to 
process and discriminate between different emotional states in others. Overall, the 
aforementioned findings unequivocally implicate fear of negative evaluation as a critical factor 
in social anxiety and provide further support the cognitive model proposed by Clark and Wells 
(1995).    
 
 




Anxiety Sensitivity  
As previously mentioned, socially anxious individuals experience marked arousal 
symptoms that they believe could be observed by others. The distress evoked by these somatic 
symptoms may be partly explained by the construct of anxiety sensitivity, which is 
operationalized as “a belief that beyond any immediate physical discomfort, anxiety and its 
accompanying symptoms may cause deleterious physical, psychological, or social 
consequences” (White & Barlow, 2002, p. 350). It may be surmised that individuals possessing 
greater anxiety sensitivity to physiological symptoms and publicly observable anxious symptoms 
may be more likely to experience the somatic symptomology (e.g., heart palpitations, tremors) 
accompanying anxiety in social evaluative and performance situations.  
Support for this hypothesis was provided in an examination of the relationship between 
personality variables and social anxiety in a non-patient population of students (Norton, Cox, 
Hewitt, & McLeod, 1997). As part of this study, the authors administered the Anxiety Sensitivity 
Index (ASI; Peterson & Reiss, 1992), a dispositional measure of the degree to which a person is 
distressed by anxiety symptoms, and the Social Phobia Scale and Social Interaction Anxiety 
Scale (SPS & SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1989). It was found that the ASI predicted scores on both 
anxiety scales; however, the ASI was the most important predictor variable only for the SPS, 
which specifically focuses on fears related to being the centre of attention and being scrutinized 
in performance situations (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). These results suggest that individuals who 
score high on the SPS fear symptoms of anxiety due to the belief that the symptoms may have 
harmful consequences in performance situations (Norton et al., 1997). Indeed, this finding is in 
line with the cognitive processing model, which states that individuals’ excessive concern with 
somatic symptoms is largely associated with their belief that these symptoms will be observed by 




others and result in failure to meet their standards of performance. The heightened anxiety 
sensitivity experienced by individuals with social anxiety may therefore result from the fear of 
being negatively evaluated when displaying publicly observable anxiety reactions (Asmundson 
& Stein, 1994).   
   The importance of anxiety sensitivity as a dimension of symptomatology in social 
anxiety was further demonstrated in an examination of the convergent validity of the ASI’s three 
lower order factors in adult patients diagnosed with panic disorder (PD), social phobia (SP), and 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) (Rector, Szacun-Shimizu, & Leybman, 2007). The three 
dimensions of interest were ASI-Physical (fear of physical symptoms), ASI-Social (fear of 
publicly observable anxiety symptoms), and ASI-Cognitive (fear of cognitive dyscontrol). 
Results revealed that ASI-Physical scores were most strongly associated with PD, whereas ASI-
Cognitive scores were most strongly correlated with GAD. Patients with social phobia scored 
highest on the ASI-Social dimension. Anderson and Hope (2007) extended the investigation of 
anxiety sensitivity in social anxiety to a younger population, attempting to determine the role of 
objective physiological arousal (measured by heart rate and blood pressure), perceived 
physiological arousal, and anxiety sensitivity in adolescents diagnosed with SP and nonanxious 
youth. Excepting an increase in heart rate that was experienced by both groups during the first 
minute of the task from the baseline, there were no significant differences between the SP and 
nonanxious control groups on measures of objective physiological arousal during anxiety-
provoking tasks. However, adolescents with social phobia reported greater perceived somatic 
arousal and exhibited higher levels of anxiety sensitivity in comparison to the nonanxious group, 
indicating a heightened awareness of increases in physiological arousal and a greater fear of 
experiencing such arousal relative to their counterparts. Therefore, and in keeping with the 




cognitive model, these factors may lead adolescents to interpret their somatic arousal as a visible 
indication of their anxiety that will lead to social embarrassment and rejection, which likely 
serves to increase the subjective intensity of the somatic symptoms. Taken together, these 
findings provide strong empirical support for the importance of anxiety sensitivity in the 
pathogenesis and maintenance of both clinical and non-clinical social anxiety.         
Intolerance of Uncertainty 
 Construct Operationalization and Measurement. The construct of intolerance of 
uncertainty (IU) has been suggested to play a central role in the development and maintenance of 
GAD and, to a lesser extent, OCD (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009). In its initial incarnation, the 
construct was operationalized as “the tendency to react negatively on an emotional, cognitive and 
behavioral level to uncertainty in everyday life situations” (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, 
& Ladouceur, 1994). Over the years, this definition has undergone a number of modifications, 
oftentimes in studies that aimed to determine the construct validity of intolerance of uncertainty 
(Birell, Meares, Wilkinson, & Freeston, 2011). Ladouceur, Blais, Freeston, and Dugas (1998) 
proposed a new definition of IU as “the way in which an individual perceives information in 
uncertain or ambiguous situations and responds to this information with a set of cognitive, 
emotional and behavioral reactions” (p. 141). In light of emerging evidence that IU may be a 
causal risk factor for clinical worry, the definition was further revised as “the excessive tendency 
of an individual to consider it unacceptable that a negative event may occur, however small the 
probability of its occurrence” (Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001, p. 552). In an attempt to 
operationalize IU in terms of specific cognitive processes, the construct was then redefined as “a 
cognitive bias that affects how a person perceives, interprets, and responds to uncertain situations 
on a cognitive, emotional, and behavioral level” (Dugas, Schwarzt, & Francis, 2004, p. 835). 




Following the discovery that individuals high in IU are more likely to interpret ambiguous 
situations as threatening, the definition of IU was once again revised as “a dispositional 
characteristic that reflects a set of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its implications” 
(Koerner & Dugas, 2006 in Koerner & Dugas, 2008. p. 620). The construct underwent a final 
revision and was defined as “a dispositional characteristic that arises from a set of negative 
beliefs about uncertainty and its connotations and consequences” (Koerner & Dugas, 2008, p. 
631). Despite this abundance of operationalizations, it might be argued that the most all-
encompassing definition of intolerance of uncertainty is that provided by Carleton, Sharpe, and 
Asmundson (2007), who defined the construct as “the tendency for a person to consider the 
possibility of a negative event occurring as unacceptable and threatening irrespective of the 
probability of its occurrence (p. 2308). 
 Excepting its shorter form, the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) developed by 
Freeston et al. (1994) is the sole measure of intolerance of uncertainty currently in use. The scale 
items were composed to correspond with six themes representative of different facets of 
intolerance of uncertainty, namely “the emotional and behavioral consequences of being 
uncertain,” “how being uncertain reflects on a person’s character,” “expectations that the future 
be predictable,” “frustration when it is not,” “attempts to control the future,” and “all-or-nothing 
responses in uncertain situations” (Freeston, 1994, p. 793). The scale has demonstrated very 
good psychometric properties, as will be discussed later.  
Contributory Role in Generalized Anxiety Disorder. Despite the potential importance 
of intolerance of uncertainty as a transdiagnotic mechanism that may contribute specifically to 
social anxiety, empirical data on the construct has been relatively scant and focused largely on 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD). The intolerance of uncertainty construct, as applied to 




GAD, posits that persons with this disorder possess a lower threshold of tolerance for uncertain 
or ambiguous situations that leads them to appraise such situations as threatening, stressful, or 
unacceptable regardless of the probability of their occurrence and associated consequences 
(Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998). Intolerance of uncertainty is believed to 
exacerbate initial “What if…?” questions and even generate them chronically in the absence of 
an immediate stimulus or trigger. It moreover precipitates the activation of positive beliefs about 
worry, such as “Worrying helps avoid disappointment,” “Worrying protects loved ones,” or 
“Worrying can stop bad things from happening” (Dugas et al., 1998, p. 216). The various types 
of worries engendered by IU fall under one of five categories of positive beliefs, namely the 
notions that worry facilitates more effective problem solving, increases one’s motivation to 
effectuate results, dampens emotional reactions to future deleterious outcomes, alters the course 
of events, and reflects positive personality traits by showing that an individual is concerned and 
well-intentioned (Wells, 2004). These worries and their accompanying anxiety lead to 
compromised awareness and appraisal of everyday problems and one’s problem-solving abilities. 
More specifically, individuals who experience intolerance of uncertainty and negative problem 
orientation lack confidence in their problem solving abilities, tend to define problems and events 
as threats, become easily distressed during problem solving attempts, and are pessimistic about 
the outcome of their problem-solving efforts (Behar et al., 2009). In addition to negative problem 
orientation, they implement negative cognitive strategies such as thought replacement, 
distraction, and suppression to avoid the invocation of threatening mental imagery and somatic 
arousal, thereby impeding emotional processing and negatively reinforcing worry and anxiety via 
short-term relief from aversive somatic arousal.   




    Ample evidence has accrued to confirm the contributory role of intolerance of 
uncertainty in worry and GAD. In a study exploring the specificity of the relationship between 
intolerance of uncertainty and worry, Dugas et al. (2001) found that IU was highly correlated 
with the tendency to worry, moderately correlated with obsessions and compulsions, and only 
weakly related to panic sensations, while IU accounted for a significant amount of the variance 
in worry scores beyond that explained by responsibility and anxiety sensitivity. Increases in 
intolerance of uncertainty also appear to elevate levels of worry, as demonstrated in an 
experimental gambling procedure wherein the levels of intolerance of uncertainty were increased 
for one group while being decreased for a second group (Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000). 
Individuals with high levels of intolerance of uncertainty have been shown to require a greater 
number of certainty cues prior to responding to a moderately ambiguous task but not before 
responding to an unambiguous or highly ambiguous task, suggesting that intolerance of 
uncertainty is associated with a lower threshold of perception of ambiguity (Ladouceur, Talbot, 
& Dugas, 1997). This finding was replicated in a study demonstrating that the beliefs underlying 
intolerance of uncertainty (e.g., “Uncertainty is dangerous,” “I can’t deal with uncertainty”) are 
more extensive and activated at a lower threshold in individuals with GAD than in persons 
diagnosed with other anxiety disorders (Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004). In fact, one 
investigation found that some individuals with GAD were so distressed by uncertainty that they 
would prefer a certain negative outcome to an unknown outcome and reported they would 
continue to worry that a feared outcome will occur unless the probability of its occurrence was 
reduced to zero (Koerner & Dugas, 2006). Further research revealed that individuals who were 
highly intolerant of uncertainty interpreted ambiguous information in a more threatening manner 
than those with low levels of intolerance, while the tendency to make threatening interpretations 




of such information was more highly associated with intolerance of uncertainty than to worry, 
anxiety, or depression (Dugas et al., 2005).  
Contributory Role in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. An inability to tolerate 
certainty has also been implicated in obsessive compulsive disorder, particularly among 
individuals who engage in compulsive checking rituals (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009). Researchers 
have theorized that the pathological doubt and accompanying intolerance of uncertainty about 
whether they have completed some action is highly distressing to these individuals and leads 
them to carry out certain compulsive behaviors or rituals in order to restore a sense of certainty 
and reduce discomfort (Steketee, Frost, & Cohen, 1998). For example, an individual may 
experience persistent doubt about whether they locked the door or completely turned off the 
stove and may return to their home several times to check these things in order to reestablish a 
sense of control and certainty. In the first and one of the only studies to examine the relationship 
between intolerance of uncertainty and OCD, the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale was 
administered to fifty-five patients with OCD and fourteen nonanxious control participants (Tolin, 
Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003). Results revealed that the proportion of individuals with 
OCD who were classified as “checkers” displayed significantly greater intolerance of uncertainty 
than noncheckers and nonanxious controls; however, OCD patients in general did not 
demonstrate greater intolerance of uncertainty than control participants, possibly due to the fact 
that non-checking compulsions are less driven by a sense of pathological doubt and uncertainty 
intolerance (Tolin et al., 2003). 
In order to gain a better understanding of the specificity of the construct, Holaway, 
Heimberg, and Coles (2006) compared intolerance of uncertainty levels among individuals with 
analogue GAD, analogue OCD, nonanxious individuals, and individuals with elevated symptoms 




of both GAD and OCD. It was found that participants in the GAD and OCD groups endorsed 
higher levels of intolerance of uncertainty than nonanxious individuals, although they did not 
significantly differ from one another in IUS scores. Individuals meeting criteria for both 
disorders reported a significantly greater degree of intolerance of uncertainty than participants in 
all other groups, suggesting that higher levels of intolerance of uncertainty are associated with 
more severe psychopathology. The relevance of the construct to both disorders was further 
corroborated by the finding that IUS scores were significantly correlated with measures of GAD, 
worry, OCD, and various compulsive behaviors, with no significant differences between the 
GAD and OCD groups and the strength of their association with intolerance of uncertainty. 
Additionally, checking and doubting compulsions demonstrated significantly greater correlations 
with intolerance of uncertainty than other compulsive behaviour subscales, lending support to the 
notion that such compulsions may function as an attempt to minimize uncertainty and associated 
distress (Holaway et al., 2006). 
Contributory Role in Social Anxiety. Although intolerance of uncertainty has been 
studied extensively within the domain of worry and GAD, there is a paucity of research on this 
construct in the area of social anxiety. To the author’s knowledge, only four studies to date have 
examined the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social anxiety. The first of 
these studies investigated the contribution of intolerance of uncertainty and other cognitive 
variables to the explained variance in social anxiety among Netherlandic adults who had suffered 
a recent loss (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009). The results indicated that uncertainty intolerance 
accounted for a significant additional 4% of the variance in social anxiety severity when 
controlling for neuroticism, fear of negative evaluation, and anxiety sensitivity. The specificity 
of the relationship of intolerance of uncertainty with symptom levels of GAD, social anxiety, 




OCD, and depression was also assessed, and it was found that GAD, social anxiety, and OCD 
but not depression were uniquely related with intolerance of uncertainty.  
Carleton, Collimore, and Asmundson (2010) sought to replicate these results with data 
from a North American community sample and to extend the findings by incorporating measures 
of specific facets of social anxiety, namely social interaction and performance anxiety, social 
distress, and avoidance. The question of generality versus specificity was again explored by 
comparing levels of intolerance of uncertainty across participants reporting symptoms congruent 
with diagnoses of social anxiety disorder (SAD), GAD, comorbid SAD and GAD, or neither 
disorder. A strong relationship independent of all other variables was found between intolerance 
of uncertainty and social anxiety, with the inhibitory anxiety dimension of the IUS accounting 
for 51% of the variance in social interaction and performance anxiety scores. After performing a 
reverse order analysis, intolerance of uncertainty continued to explain a significant 4% of the 
variance in social anxiety above and beyond negative affect, positive affect, fear of negative 
evaluation, and the dimension of the ASI measuring fear of socially observable anxiety 
symptoms. It was also found that individuals who reported symptoms congruent with either SAD 
or GAD exhibited similar levels of intolerance of uncertainty, whereas individuals who reported 
symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of comorbid SAD and GAD displayed significantly higher 
levels of intolerance of uncertainty than all other groups. These results provide further support 
for the notion that intolerance of uncertainty may be a transdiagnostic cognitive feature that 
manifests itself in distinct ways across a number of anxiety disorders (Carleton et al., 2010).     
The sole investigation of intolerance of uncertainty and social anxiety in adolescents to 
date aimed to examine associations of intolerance of uncertainty with worry, social anxiety, and 
depression; the specificity of intolerance of uncertainty to these symptoms after controlling for 




levels of negative affectivity; and the mediational role of intolerance of uncertainty in the 
relationship between negative affect and worry, social anxiety, and depression. The adolescents 
involved in the study were between the ages of 14 and 18 and reported symptoms consistent with 
GAD, SAD, or depression. While it was found that intolerance of uncertainty was significantly 
correlated with worry, social anxiety, and depression, participants’ score on the short version of 
the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS-12; Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007) was 
uniquely related only to worry and social anxiety after adjusting for demographic variables, 
negative affect, and the shared variance between the three types of symptoms. Moreover, the 
Prospective Anxiety dimension of the IUS-12, the Inhibitory Anxiety dimension of the IUS-12, 
and the IUS-12 total score all served as partial mediators of the relationship between negative 
affectivity and worry and negative affectivity and social anxiety.  
The most recent study of intolerance of uncertainty in social anxiety sought to replicate 
and extend the findings of Boelen and Reijntjes (2009) and Carleton et al. (2010) by examining 
the specificity of the construct to two distinct social anxiety subtypes, namely social interaction 
anxiety and performance anxiety (Whiting et al., 2014). The results indicated that intolerance of 
uncertainty accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in both anxiety subtypes above 
and beyond worry, perfectionism, and fear of negative evaluation, while IUS-12 Inhibitory 
Anxiety significantly contributed to both performance anxiety and social interaction anxiety 
scores. Interestingly, it was also found that individuals who exceeded the clinical cut-off scores 
for both subtypes experienced greater intolerance of uncertainty than individuals high in only 
one social anxiety subtype or neither, suggesting an additive effect of intolerance of uncertainty 
in the presence of both anxiety subtypes (Whiting et al., 2014).  
The Present Study 




Although the reviewed studies indicate that intolerance of uncertainty and social anxiety 
are highly related, the question of how intolerance of uncertainty might contribute to social 
anxiety is yet to be empirically examined. To the author’s knowledge, there are no existing 
studies that have investigated a theoretical model which hypothesizes that the relationship 
between intolerance of uncertainty and social anxiety level is mediated by negative 
interpretations of ambiguous social information Testing this model will provide important 
information in understanding how social anxiety is developed and maintained. The first purpose 
of this study was to examine whether intolerance of uncertainty contributes any significant 
variance in social anxiety severity above and beyond that accounted for by fear of negative 
evaluation, anxiety sensitivity, and depression. The second aim of the study was to investigate 
whether social anxiety severity is associated with greater levels of intolerance of uncertainty and 
a greater tendency to interpret ambiguous social stimuli (lexical and pictorial) in a negative 
manner. The final purpose of the study was to examine whether fear of negative evaluation and 
negative interpretation bias mediate the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and 
social anxiety. In keeping with Dugas et al. (2004), intolerance of uncertainty was 
operationalized as “a cognitive bias that affects how a person perceives, interprets, and responds 
to uncertain situations on a cognitive, emotional, and behavioral level” (p. 835). With these 
objectives in mind, the following hypotheses were proposed: 
1) Intolerance of uncertainty will uniquely explain additional variance in social anxiety 
scores after controlling for fear of negative evaluation, anxiety sensitivity, and 
depression. 
2) Participants who meet or exceed the clinical cut-off scores for both the Social Phobia 
Scale (SPS) and the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS), and those who meet or 




exceed the clinical cut-off scores for only SIAS or SPS, will report greater intolerance of 
uncertainty and fear of negative evaluation than will those who did not exceed any cut-
offs. Further, those who meet or exceed the clinical cut-off scores for both the SPS and 
the SIAS will experience greater intolerance of uncertainty and fear of negative 
evaluation than those exceeding the cut-off scores for only SIAS or SPS.  
Participants were assigned to the SIAS+SPS group, SIAS/SPS Only group, or CTRL 
group based on the levels of severity, avoidance, and impairment associated with their 
scores as outlined by Mattick and Clarke (1998). According to the authors of the scales, 
cut-offs of 34 or more out of a total score of 60 are indicative of specific situations of 
irrational fears with avoidance and impairment in social interaction or performance 
situations (depending on the scale), with higher scores indicative of more generalized 
irrational fears across numerous social interaction or performance situations with 
avoidance and impairment. Based on these guidelines, participants with a total score up 
to 33.99 were assigned to the CTRL group; participants with a score of 34 or higher on 
either measure were assigned to the SIAS/SPS Only group; and those with a score of 34 
or higher on both measures were assigned to the SIAS+SPS group.  3. Participants who 
meet or exceed the clinical cut-off scores for both the SPS and the SIAS, and those who 
meet or exceed the clinical cut-off scores for only SIAS or SPS, will 1) rank negative 
interpretations of ambiguous social situations on the ASSIQ as more likely to come to 
mind quickly and 2) report greater belief in the accuracy of the negative interpretations 
than control participants. Moreover, those who meet or exceed the clinical cut-off scores 
for both measures of anxiety will 1) rank negative interpretations of ambiguous social 
situations as more likely to come to mind and 2) report greater belief in the accuracy of 






Participants – Pilot Session 
 Ten doctoral students recruited from amongst the Psychology graduate student body pilot 
tested the Affective Picture Rating Task. Graduate students were recruited through a mass email 
inviting them to participate in a brief pilot session testing a novel computerized measure of 
information processing in social anxiety (see Appendix A). 
Participants - Study 
One-hundred sixty-four female and 46 male students enrolled in undergraduate courses at 
Lakehead University participated in part one (online) of the study. Of the initial 210 participants, 
51 female and 15 male students completed part two (in-lab). They were recruited through the 
SONA online participant management system, a psychology research participant pool operating 
to recruit students who wish to participate in research studies. One classroom announcement was 
made and a mass email (Appendix D) with the details of the study was circulated to students to 
encourage participation in the study. The email contained a hyperlink to the online data gathering 
website SurveyMonkey, where participants completed a battery of self-report questionnaires that 
constituted the first part of the study. A poster (Appendix E) approved by the Lakehead 
University Student Union was also affixed throughout the university to facilitate recruitment. 
The poster contained a hyperlink to a webpage with the same information included in the email 
and the contact information of the research investigator. Participants were granted 1 bonus point 
for completing the battery of online questionnaires and 1.25 bonus points for completing the 
laboratory visit.  
Materials 




Demographic questionnaire. A demographic questionnaire was used to collect 
information on variables such as age, sex, gender, educational level, year of study, occupational 
status, and marital status (Appendix J). 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index - 3 (ASI-3; Taylor et al., 2007; Appendix K). This measure 
contains 18 items intended to assess the tendency to fear anxiety-related bodily sensations based 
on the belief that they may have harmful consequences. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from 0 (very little) to 4 (very much). Factor analytic studies have demonstrated a 3-
factor structure corresponding to the three dimensions of the scale, namely fear of somatic 
sensations (somatic) fear of cognitive dyscontrol (cognitive), and fear of socially observable 
symptoms of anxiety (social) (Taylor, Koch, Woody, & McLean, 1996; Zinbarg, Barlow, & 
Brown, 1997). The ASI-3 has shown high internal consistency for the total score (α = .92), the 
somatic subscale score (α = .86), the cognitive subscale score (α = .89), and the social subscale 
score (α = .84) (Peterson & Reiss, 1992). The average inter-item correlation of .40 was within 
the acceptable range. This measure has also demonstrated evidence for convergent, discriminant, 
and criterion validity (Taylor et al., 2007).  
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale and Social Phobia Scale (SIAS & SPS; Mattick and 
Clarke, 1998; Appendix L & M). The SIAS and SPS were developed concurrently as companion 
measures that assess two dimensions of social anxiety. Items on the SIAS assess an individual’s 
cognitive, behavioral, or affective responses to anxiety related to social interaction in dyads or 
groups, whereas items on the SPS assess fear of being scrutinized in specific performance 
situations. Each instrument contains 20 items that are rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging 
from 0 (not at all a characteristic or true of me) to 4 (extremely characteristic or true of me). 
Both scales have demonstrated strong internal consistency and test-retest reliability. Across five 




patient and control groups, Cronbach’s α values ranged from .88 to .94, while test-retest 
reliability coefficients ranged from .91 to .93 for both scales after intervals of one month and 
three months (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). In terms of validity, Mattick and Clarke (1998) found 
that SIAS and SPS scores were positively correlated with a number of other standard measures 
of social anxiety (r = .54-.69) as well as with each other (r = .72). Peters (2000) moreover found 
that both scales correlated highly with the Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (SPAI; Turner, 
Beidel, Dancu, & Stanley, 1989). The SIAS and SPS have also evidenced good discriminant 
validity, being able to differentiate patients with social phobia from patients with other anxiety 
disorders and community volunteers (Mattick & Clarke, 1998).   
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & 
Ladouceur, 1994; Appendix N). This instrument contains 27 items pertaining to the notion that 
uncertainty is unacceptable, reflects badly on a person, and leads to frustration, distress, and an 
inability to take action. Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at 
all characteristic of me) to 5 (entirely characteristic of me). The obtained Cronbach’s alpha of 
.91 in Freeston et al.’s (1994) original study indicates strong internal reliability of the Intolerance 
of Uncertainty Scale. Buhr and Dugas (2002) further examined the scale and reported excellent 
internal consistency (α = 0.94) as well as a reliability coefficient of 0.74 derived from 
participants who were re-tested after five weeks. The Dutch version of the IUS yielded alphas of 
0.88 in a sample of students and 0.94 in a sample of anxiety-disordered patients (de Bruin, 
Rassin, van der Heiden & Muris, 2006). A subsample of students was retested four weeks after 
the initial assessment, and the test-retest reliability coefficient was 0.79. In the only empirical 
study aiming to conduct a cross-cultural examination of the IUS, Norton (2006) examined the 
psychometric characteristics of the scale in a sample of undergraduate students of African, 




Caucasian, Hispanic, and Southeast Asian descent. Internal consistency across the entire sample 
was excellent (α = 0.95), while coefficient alpha values were similarly high across African 
American participants (α = .95), Caucasian participants (α = .94), Hispanic participants (α = .93), 
and Southeast Asian participants (α = .95).  
Confirmatory factor analyses have yielded two factors labeled prospective anxiety and 
inhibitory anxiety, with the former involving fear of uncertainty related to future events and the 
latter pertaining to uncertainty inhibiting action or experience (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2010). The 
subscales based on these two factors and the total scale exhibited excellent internal reliability 
with corresponding Cronbach alphas of .88, .88, and .93, respectively. The scale has likewise 
demonstrated good convergent validity. More specifically, it has yielded a coefficient of .57 with 
the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) and of .50 with the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). Norton’s (2005) 
previously mentioned cross-cultural investigation yielded correlation coefficients between the 
IUS and the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-IV (GADQ-IV; Newman et al., 2002) 
of .69, .63, .69, and .52 for the African American, Caucasian, Hispanic, and Southeast Asian 
groups, respectively.  
Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale - 2 (BFNE-II; Carleton, Collimore, & 
Asmundson, 2007; Appendix O). The BFNE-II is a 12-item revised version of the Brief Fear of 
Negative Evaluation scale (BFNE; Leary, 1983) used to assess apprehension or distress as a 
result of others' evaluations. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all 
characteristic of me) to 4 (extremely characteristic of me). The instrument has demonstrated 
excellent internal consistency (α = .98), a reliability coefficient of .75 after a four week interval, 
and an average inter-item correlation of .76. It has been shown to correlate highly with the 




original BFNE (r = .96), while factor analyses confirmed the construct validity of the scale as a 
unitary measure of fear of negative evaluation (Carleton et al., 2007; Carleton, McCreary, 
Norton, & Asmundson, 2006). 
Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale -21 (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; 
Appendix P). This measure contains three subscales designed to measure dysphoric mood 
(Depression subscale, DASS-D), symptoms of fear and autonomic arousal (Anxiety subscale, 
DASS-A), and symptoms of general nervousness and agitation (Stress subscale, DASS-S). Items 
are rated on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (did not apply to me at all) to 3 (applied to me 
very much). Analyses of the scale’s psychometric properties have yielded Cronbach’s alphas of 
.94, .87, and .91 for the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress subscales, respectively (Antony, 
Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998). Similar results were obtained by Mahmoud, Hall, and 
Staten (2010), who reported Cronbach’s alphas of .90 for Depression, .83 for Anxiety, and .86 
for Stress. Concerning validity, The DASS-21 Stress subscale demonstrated moderately high 
correlations (r = .68 -.70) with measures of depression and anxiety such as the BAI, STAI-T, and 
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Antony et al., 1998). 
The Depression subscale was strongly correlated with the BDI (r = .79), while the Anxiety 
subscale displayed a strong correlation with the BAI (r = .85) and a moderate correlation with 
the STAI-T (r = .55). Additionally, Mahmoud et al. (2010) found that the DASS-21 was 
moderately associated with measures of maladaptive coping (r = .54 -.58) and negatively 
associated with measures of adaptive coping and life satisfaction (r = -.12 - -.35). Principal 
component analyses performed on data obtained from college students, a community sample, and 
a clinical sample moreover supported the 3-dimensional factor structure of the instrument and 




the theoretical perspective of the tripartite model on which it is based (Antony et al., 1998; Henry 
& Crawford, 2005; Mahmoud et al., 2010).  
Affective Picture Rating Task. The Affective Picture Rating Task is a computerized 
task developed to assess interpretation bias. The task commences with a set of instructions 
indicating that a number of pictures will be displayed on the computer monitor, one at a time. 
Following each presentation, the participant must indicate the pleasantness of the picture using 
the keyboard, where 1 = very unpleasant and 9 = very pleasant. After reading the instructions, 
participants initiate a block of 4 practice trials to ensure that the task is understood. Upon 
completion of the practice block, participants proceed with 60 experimental trials, all of which 
are preceded by the caption “Get ready to rate the next slide.” Each warning slide is displayed for 
5000ms. Following the warning slide, the to-be-rated picture is displayed on the computer 
monitor for 3000ms. The decision to display the pictorial stimuli for 3000ms is based on the 
hypothesis that this time interval will enable participants to attend to the picture without 
engaging in the potential elaboration and reprocessing of stimuli that can occur during prolonged 
exposure (Koerner, Hedayati, & Dugas, 2004). A fixed random order of presentation of the 
stimuli will be employed. The pictures included in the task have been selected from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley& Cuthbert, 2008), which contains a 
set of standardized, emotionally-evocative color photographs depicting various persons and 
scenes. In order to increase the ecological validity of the task, care was taken to select pictures 
depicting facial expressions, pictures depicting non-verbal full-body behaviour, and pictures 
depicting ambiguous social interactions.  
To determine the final set of positive, negative, neutral, and ambiguous pictures that 
would constitute the task, a group of 10 doctoral students who were blind to the goals of the 




study pilot tested a number of photographs obtained from IAPS. The students were asked to rate 
the pleasantness of the pictures using the aforementioned scale and to classify each picture into 
one of the four categories. Pictures that demonstrated high inter-rater agreement (k = .90 or 
greater) were retained and included in the APRT (see Appendix V-Y for examples of positive, 
negative, neutral, and ambiguous pictures). The task, which was programmed using SuperLab 5 
(Cedrus Corporation), was presented on a desktop computer. All pictures were displayed with 
dimensions of 10.67 X 8 inches at a resolution of 72 pixels per inch.  
Ambiguous Social Vignette I & II (Constans, Penn, Ihen, & Hope, 1999; Appendix Q & 
R). The two vignettes depict a “blind” date between two college-aged students. The description 
of the date contains information pertaining to the couple’s initial meeting, dining at a restaurant, 
and attendance at a party. Incorporated in the vignette are a number of ambiguous statements and 
behaviors concerning both interpersonal evaluation and evaluation of non-personal stimuli. The 
evaluations cannot be disambiguated on the basis of other contextual details in the story. In 
Constans et al.’s (1999) original study, males and females were administered separate versions of 
the vignette that differed solely in the gender of the protagonist and his or her date (vignette 1 = 
male protagonist, vignette 2 = female protagonist).  
Ambiguous Judgment Questionnaire I & II (Constans, Penn, Ihen, & Hope, 1999; 
Appendix S & T). The 19-item questionnaires contain items designed to assess participants’ 
interpretation of events that were described in the story. The items assess both interpretation of 
ambiguous statements related to interpersonal evaluation (5 interpersonal interpretation items) 
and interpretation of ambiguous non-personal evaluations (3 non-personal interpretation items). 
Each of these 8 items is rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored at each end by the 
descriptors “Strongly disagree” and “Strongly agree,” with “Neutral” at the midpoint. Seven 




“memory items” assessing accuracy of recall for non-emotional details are included to ensure 
that participants have adequate comprehension of the study, and the remaining 3 items serve as 
filler queries. The ambiguous social vignette and judgment questionnaire were pilot tested with 
22 undergraduate students to ensure that the ambiguous events depicted in the story were indeed 
perceived as ambiguous. It was expected that perceived ambiguity would be reflected in ratings 
of approximately 4 on the 7-point scale, as this midpoint value would demonstrate that 
participants neither agreed nor disagreed with the interpretation of the event described in the 
item. The obtained mean score for these items of 3.93 (SD = 1.07) confirmed that the events 
were perceived as ambiguous by the students.     
Ambiguous Social Situation Interpretation Questionnaire (ASSIQ; Stopa & Clark, 
2000; Appendix U). This measure was developed to assess negative interpretation bias in 
individuals with social phobia. It contains 14 ambiguous social situations (e.g., “You are talking 
to an acquaintance who briefly looks out of the window”) and 10 control situations (“A letter 
marked ‘urgent’ arrives). Each situation is followed by the question “Why?,” which prompts 
participants to write down the first explanation that comes to mind. Once they have written their 
response, participants turn the page and rank order three alternative explanations in terms of the 
extent to which “they would be most likely to come to your mind if you found yourself in a 
similar situation” (Stopa & Clark, 2000; p. 276). Each situation is accompanied by one negative 
alternative explanation, with the remaining two explanations being either both neutral in nature 
or one positive and one neutral. Scores for the ranking data were based on the rank order of the 
negative explanation/answer. A score of 3, 2, or 1 was given depending on whether the negative 
explanation/answer was ranked first, second, or third. Upon completing the questionnaire, 
participants read an additional instruction sheet asking them to return to the beginning of the 




questionnaire and to rate each situation in terms of the extent to which they would believe each 
of the three alternative explanations if they were in that specific situation. The degree of belief in 
the alternative explanations is rated on an 8-point Likert-type scale anchored at each end by the 
descriptors “Not at all” and “Extremely,” with “Moderately” at the midpoint.      
Procedure 
Upon visiting the SurveyMonkey website, participants viewed an information letter 
(Appendix G) and a participant consent agreement (Appendix H). Once they provided their 
consent to participate in the study, they proceeded to a battery of questionnaires comprising of 
the demographic questionnaire, the ASI, the SIAS, the SPS, the IUS, the BFNE-II, and the 
DASS-21. Following completion of the questionnaires, participants who wished to continue 
participation signed up for the laboratory session which constituted the second portion of the 
experiment. At the beginning of the scheduled laboratory visit, participants were explained the 
structure and content of the session and provided with detailed instruction on how to complete 
the Ambiguous Social Situation Interpretation Questionnaire. Next, they read the Ambiguous 
Social Vignette and completed the Ambiguous Judgment Questionnaire assessing their 
interpretation of events described in the story. Finally, they completed the Affective Picture 
Rating Task. At the end of the laboratory session, participants were provided with a debriefing 
form (Appendix I) and were given information about the true purpose of the study. The data 
obtained from the battery of online questionnaires, in-lab questionnaires, and the Affective 
Picture Rating Task were entered into the software Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS; version 23).   
Results 
Data Screening  




Data were first checked for accuracy of entry and missing values. Each item’s minimum 
and maximum values were within the expected range. Reverse-scored items were double-
checked to ensure that they were coded correctly. The range of missing data was from 0% to 
1.9%. Two participants skipped two or more scales and were consequently excluded from data 
analysis. Little’s MCAR test was computed to determine whether there was any pattern in the 
missing data. The MCAR test obtained for this study’s data resulted in a chi-square = 4880.271 
(df = 4665; p<.014), which indicated that the data was not missing completely at random. A 
dummy variable was then created (i.e., participants with/without missing data) and independent 
samples t-tests were computed on the dummy variable to test differences on key variables. The 
non-significant t-test results indicated a lack of pattern to the missing data, excepting the DASS 
where participants with missing data had higher scores compared to participants without missing 
data [t(199) = 2.258, p < 0.05)]. As there was a small amount of missing data overall, missing 
values were replaced with participants’ variable mean.  
The dataset was checked for both univariate and multivariate outliers. To identify 
univariate outliers, z-scores were created and cases with z-values greater than 3.3 were 
considered as outliers. Two participants had univariate outliers, and their scores were flagged for 
further analysis. Mahalanobis distance was computed and revealed two multivariate outliers, 
which were deleted from the data based on recommendations from Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2012). Skewness and kurtosis values were in the acceptable range for normal distribution of 
data, with the exception of the Negative category of the Affective Picture Rating Task. Closer 
inspection of the data identified the univariate outliers as likely causes for the violation of 
kurtosis. The outliers’ scores were changed to a unit larger than the last case that fit in the 
distribution. Following this adjustment, the values of skewness and kurtosis were within normal 




limits. The assumption of homoscedasticity was checked for all variables through visual analysis 
of bivariate scatterplots. All scatterplots displayed roughly the same width all over with some 
bulging toward the middle. The range for multicollinearity was examined through correlations 
among the variables and no concerns were identified.     
Sample Characteristics 
The mean age of participants who completed only part one of the study (n = 210) was 
20.9 (SD = 5.3) and the range was between 16 and 52 years of age. The sample included 
participants who self-identified as female (76.2%), male (21.4%), transgender (.5%), and gender 
variant/non-conforming (1.4%; see Table 1). The majority of respondents were of Caucasian 
descent (79.5%). Of the respondents, 51% were in their first year of university, 22.4% were in 
their second year, 15.7% were in their third year, 8.6% were in their fourth year, and 2.4% were 
in their fifth (or more) year. Thirty-six percent declared Psychology as their major, whereas 42% 
were neither majoring nor minoring in Psychology. Concerning occupational status, 94.8% of 
respondents reported being a full-time student, with nearly a third also reporting part-time 
employment. Lastly, 82.9% reported being single, 12.9% reported cohabitating, 2.9% percent 
reported being married, and a small fraction reported being divorced and widowed (.5% and .5%, 
respectively). Demographic characteristics of participants who completed both parts of the study 
(n = 66) were similar (see Table 1).  
Psychometric Properties of Study Variables 
The psychometric properties of all study measures are displayed in Table 2. Excepting 
the Social Vignette & Judgment Questionnaire, all measures obtained Cronbach’s alpha values 
of .90 or above. Nunnally and Bernstein (1996) suggested that a Cronbach's alpha of.70 is 
acceptable for new measures, indicating that the coefficient alpha of .74 obtained for the Social  





Demographic Characteristics of Study Participants  
Characteristic n (Time 1 Online) n (Time 2 In-lab) 
Age, mean (SD)  20.9 ± 5.3 22.5 ± 6.2 
Sex 
    Female 
    Male 
Gender 
    Female 
    Male 
    Transgender 
    Gender variant/Non-conforming 
    Prefer not to answer 
Ethnicity 
    White/Caucasian 
    Asian 
    Black/African Canadian 
    First Nations 
    Other 
Education 
    University Year 1 
    University Year 2   
    University Year 3   
    University Year 4   
    University Year 5 (or more) 
Psychology: 
    Major 
    Minor 
    Neither 
    Undecided 
Occupational Status 
    Full-time student 
    Part-time student 
    Full-time employee 
    Part-time employee 
    Unemployed 
Marital Status 
    Married 
    Cohabitating 
    Single 
    Divorced 
    Widowed 
 
 
164   (78.1%) 
  46   (21.9%) 
 
160   (76.2%) 
  45   (21.4%) 
    1   (    .5%) 
    3   (  1.4%) 
    1   (    .5%) 
 
167   (79.5%) 
  12   (  5.7%)     
    9   (  4.3%) 
    9   (  4.3%) 
  13   (  6.2%) 
 
107   (51.0%) 
  47   (22.4%) 
  33   (15.7%) 
  18   (  8.6%) 
    5   (  2.4%) 
 
  76   (36.2%) 
  16   (  7.6%) 
  88   (41.9%) 
  30   (14.3%) 
   
199   (94.8%) 
  11   (  5.2%) 
    7   (  3.3%) 
  63   (30.0%) 
  10   (  4.8%) 
 
    6   (  2.9%) 
  27   (12.9%) 
174   (82.9%) 
    1   (    .5%) 
    1   (    .5%) 
     
 
51   (77.3%) 
15   (22.7%) 
 
49   (74.2%) 
15   (22.7%) 
1     (  1.5%) 
0     (  0.0%) 
1     (  1.5%) 
 
55   (83.3%) 
1     (  1.5%) 
4     (  6.1%) 
3     (  4.5%) 
3     (  4.6%)  
 
25   (37.9%) 
21   (31.8%) 
11   (16.7%) 
  6   (  9.1%) 
  3   (  4.5%) 
 
30   (45.5%) 
  4   (  6.1%) 
24   (36.4%) 
  8   (12.1%) 
 
63   (95.5%) 
  3   (  4.5%) 
  3   (  4.5%) 
22   (33.3%) 
  3   (  4.5%) 
 
  5   (  7.6%) 
  8   (12.1%) 
53   (80.3%)  
  0   (  0.0%) 
  0   (  0.0%) 
 




Table 1 Continued 
Note. The variation in sample size on some demographic variables is due to the variation in the 
number of participants who provided a response to the particular item.  
Vignette & Judgment Questionnaire represents a modest degree of homogeneity among test 
items. Intercorrelations Among Study Measures 
 Intercorrelations between study measures completed online (part 1) and in-lab (part 2) are 
presented separately in Tables 3 and 4, with the remaining tables displaying correlations between 
all study measures completed by individuals who participated in both parts of the study. As can 
be seen in Table 3, all measures administered online were strongly correlated with each other and 
were in support of the hypothesis that participants with greater social anxiety severity will report 
higher levels of intolerance of uncertainty and fear of negative evaluation. Specifically, SIAS 
scores were strongly correlated with scores on the IUS, r = .64, p < .01, and BFNE-2, r = .71, p 
< .01, while SPS scores were similarly correlated with these two measures, r = 65, p < .01 and r 
= .69, p < .01. The two measures of social anxiety were strongly correlated with each other, r 
= .81, p < .01, reflecting the fact that they tap the same underlying constructs. Higher levels of 
intolerance of uncertainty were moreover significantly associated with greater anxiety sensitivity, 
r = .65, p < .01, and depression severity, r = .69, p < .01.   
Table 4 illustrates a significant inverse relationship between ranking scores on the ASSIQ 
and ratings of ambiguous interpersonal events on the social vignette, r = -.27, p < .05, as well as 
between belief ratings in the accuracy of negative appraisals and ratings of ambiguous 
interpersonal events on the social vignette, r = -.25, p < .05. In other words, the higher the 
likelihood of having negative interpretations come to mind on the ASSIQ and believing in their 
accuracy, the less positive the appraisals of ambiguous interpersonal events on the social vignette. 




The correlations between participants’ scores on the IUS, SIAS, SPS, BFNE-2, ASI-3, DASS-21, 
and ASSIQ are displayed in Table 5. The direction and magnitude of associations between the 
six online measures in this subgroup of 66 participants are similar to those obtained in the entire 
sample of 210 participants. IUS, SIAS, SPS, BFNE-2, ASI-3, and DASS-21 scores were all 
significantly correlated with ranking scores on the ASSIQ and belief ratings for the negative 
explanations on the ASSIQ. This indicates that higher scores on these six measures correspond 
with a greater likelihood that the negative interpretation will come to mind quickly and a greater 
belief in the accuracy of the interpretation. Ranking scores for the negative (social) explanations 
on the ASSIQ were strongly correlated with belief ratings for the negative interpretations of 
ambiguous social scenarios, r = .82, p < .01. That is, the greater the likelihood of having a 
negative interpretation come to mind quickly, the greater the belief in the accuracy of that 
negative interpretation. It was also found that higher social interaction anxiety scores were 
associated with a lower likelihood of selecting a neutral explanation for ambiguous social 
scenarios, r = -.32, p < .01. Having a negative interpretation come to mind more quickly was 
moreover correlated with a lower likelihood of selecting a neutral explanation, r = -.41, p < .01. 
Regarding the Ambiguous Social Vignette and Judgment Questionnaire, SIAS and 
BFNE-2 scores were inversely correlated with ratings on interpersonal interpretation items (see 
Table 6). Specifically, greater social interaction anxiety and fear of negative evaluation were 
associated with a less favorable interpretation of ambiguous interpersonal events. Scores on the 
IUS, SIAS, SPS, BFNE-2, ASI-3, DASS-21, and the Social Vignette and Judgment 
Questionnaire were not significantly correlated with pleasantness ratings of ambiguous, negative, 
neutral, or positive pictures from the APRT. 
Hypothesis 1 – Does intolerance of uncertainty predict social anxiety? 




 To test the hypothesis that intolerance of uncertainty will uniquely explain additional 
variance in social anxiety scores after controlling for fear of negative evaluation, anxiety 
sensitivity, and depression, a hierarchical regression analysis was performed with each of the 
SIAS scores and SPS scores as dependent variables (two separate regressions). Scores on the 
FNE were entered in the first step, ASI-3 and DASS-21 scores were entered in the second step, 
and IUS scores were entered in the third step. Fear of negative evaluation accounted for 50.4% of 
the variability in SIAS scores, F(1, 208) = 211.46, p < .001, and it was a significant predictor, β 
= .42, p < .001. ASI-3 and DASS-21 scores explained an additional 6.8% of variability, F(2, 
206) = 91.70, p < .001, however they were not significant predictors. Finally, IUS accounted for 
an additional 2.3% of variability, F(1, 205) = 75.27, p < .001, and it was a significant predictor 
of change in SIAS scores, β = .23, p < .01. The second regression (using SPS scores as the 
dependent variable) revealed that fear of negative evaluation accounted for 47.2% of the 
variability in SPS scores, F(1, 208) = 185.94, p < .001, and it was a significant predictor, β = .27, 
p < .001. ASI-3 and DASS-21 scores explained an additional 17.7% of variability, F(2, 206) =  
127.07, p < .001, and they were likewise significant predictors [β = .36, p < .001 and β = .17, p < 
.05, respectively]. Finally, IUS accounted for a small additional .01% of variability, F(1, 205) = 
98.00, p < .001, and it was a significant predictor of change in SPS scores, β = .13, p < .05.  
Hypothesis 2 – Do intolerance of uncertainty and fear of negative evaluation differ between 
clinical groups?   
It was hypothesized that participants who met or exceeded the clinical cut-off scores for 
both the SPS and the SIAS, and those who met or exceeded the clinical cut-off scores for only 
SIAS or SPS, will report greater IU and FNE than will those who did not exceed any cut-offs. 





Psychometric Properties of Study Variables  
Scale n M SD  Minimum Maximum Skew 
        
IUS  210 2.40 .70 .95 1.00 4.89 .33 
SIAS 210 1.60 .77 .94 .00 3.40 .30 
SPS 210 1.19 .80 .95 .00 3.70 .79 
BFNE-2 210 2.99 1.00 .96 1.00 5.00 -.13 
ASI-3 210 1.03 .78 .93 .00 3.47 .89 
DASS-21 210 .87 .55 .94 .00 2.57 .59 
ASSIQ 66 4.00 .82 .90 1.00 7.89 .19 
















APRT 66 4.61 .83 .93 1.00 9.00 -.59 
Note. Part 1 online = 210 participants; part 2 in-lab = 66 of the initial 210 participants. 
Table 3 
Intercorrelations Amongst Part 1 Study Variables (n = 210)  
Measure IUS SIAS SPS BFNE-2 ASI-3 DASS-21 
IUS 1      
SIAS .64** 1     
SPS .65** .81** 1    
BFNE-2 .61** .71** .69** 1   
ASI-3 .65** .62** .74** .63** 1  
DASS-21 .69** .62** .69** .61** .72** 1 
Note. IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; SPS = Social Phobia Scale; BFNE-2 = Brief 
Fear of Negative Evaluation – 2; ASI-3 = Anxiety Sensitivity Scale – 3; DASS-21 = Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale – 21.        
*. p < .05, **. p < .01 





Intercorrelations Amongst Part 2 Study Variables (n = 66)  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
             
ASSIQ Ranking Scores (1-3) 
1. Social Situations 
2. Control Situations 
ASSIQ Belief Ratings for Negative 
Explanation (0-8) 
3. Interpersonal Situations 
4. Non-personal Situations 
ASSIQ Belief Ratings for Neutral 
Explanation (0-8) 
5. Social Situations 



































































      
Ambiguous Social Vignette and 
Judgment questionnaire (1-7)   
7. Interpersonal Situations 
8. Non-personal Situations 
Affective Picture Rating Task (0-9) 
9. Ambiguous Pictures 
10. Negative Pictures 
11. Neutral Pictures 















































































































*. p < .05,  
**. p < .01  
 





Intercorrelations for Scores on the IUS, SIAS, SPS, BFNE-2, ASI-3, DASS-21, and ASSIQ (Part 1 & 2)  
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
             
1. IUS 1            
2. SIAS .71** 1           
3. SPS .70** .81** 1          
4. BFNE-2  .73** .71** .69** 1         
5. ASI-3 .56** .49** .63** .62** 1        
6. DASS-21 .70** .64** .75** .62** .71** 1       
ASSIQ Ranking Scores  
7. Social Situations 
8. Control Situations 
ASSIQ Belief Ratings for 
Negative Explanation  
9. Social Situations 
10. Control Situations 
ASSIQ Belief Ratings for 
Neutral Explanation  
11. Social Situations 







































































































































Note: n = 66 
*. p < .05 
**. p < .01 
 





Intercorrelations for Scores on the IUS, SIAS, SPS, BFNE-2, ASI-3, DASS-21, Ambiguous Social Vignette and Judgment 
Questionnaire, & APRT  
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
             
1. IUS 1            
2. SIAS .71** 1           
3. SPS .70** .81** 1          
4. BFNE-2 .73** .71** .69** 1         
5. ASI-3 .56** .49** .63** .62** 1        
6. DASS-21 .70** .64** .75** .62** .71** 1       
Ambiguous Social Vignette 
and Judgment questionnaire  
7. Interpersonal Situations 
8. Non-personal Situations 
Affective Picture Rating Task  
9. Ambiguous Pictures 
10. Negative Pictures 
11. Neutral Pictures 

















































































































Note: n = 66 
*. p < .05 
**. p < .01 




Further, those who met or exceeded the clinical cut-off scores for both the SPS and the SIAS 
were hypothesized to experience greater IU and FNE than those exceeding the cut-off scores for 
only SIAS or SPS. In order to examine IU’s relationship to the severity of social anxiety, a one-
way ANOVA with group (SIAS+SPS, SIAS/SPS Only, CTRL) as the independent variable and 
IUS scores as the dependent variable was computed. The analysis produced a statistically 
significant result, F(2,207) = 66.18, p < .001. Scheffe´ post hoc analyses indicated that all three 
group means were significantly different from one another, p < .001. The SIAS+SPS group and 
the SIAS/SPS Only group scored significantly higher on the IUS than the CTRL group, while the 
SIAS+SPS group also scored significantly higher than the SIAS/SPS Only group. A similar 
ANOVA with FNE as the dependent variable revealed a statistically significant result, F(2,207) 
= 54.52, p < .001. Post hoc analyses indicated that SIAS+SPS group and the SIAS/SPS Only 
group reported significantly greater fear of negative evaluation on the BFNE-2 than the CTRL 
group, while the SIAS+SPS group also reported greater fear of negative evaluation than the 
SIAS/SPS Only group, p < .001. 
Similar results were found among the subsample of participants. A one-way ANOVA 
with group (SIAS+SPS, SIAS/SPS Only, CTRL) as the independent variable and IUS scores as 
the dependent variable was conducted, and the analysis produced a statistically significant result, 
F(2,63) = 27.82, p < .001. Scheffe´ post hoc analyses indicated that all three group means were 
significantly different from one another, p < .05. The SIAS+SPS group and the SIAS/SPS Only 
group scored significantly higher on the IUS than the CTRL group, while the SIAS+SPS group 
also scored significantly higher than the SIAS/SPS Only group. A similar ANOVA with FNE as 
the dependent variable produced a statistically significant result, F(2,63) = 21.08, p < .001. Post 
hoc analyses showed that the SIAS+SPS group and the SIAS/SPS Only group scored  





ANOVA Results and Descriptive Statistics for IUS and BFNE Scores by Type of Clinical Group  
 IUS Scores 
       n                M                SD 
 BFNE Scores 
             n                M                SD 
1. Does not meet cutoff score 117 55.00 14.69 117 29.85 10.65 
2. Meets or exceeds cutoff 
score for one measure 41 68.80 15.30 41 39.88 9.18 
3. Meets or exceeds cutoff 
score for both measures 
52 82.30 13.33 52 46.14 7.92 
Total 210 64.46 18.46 210 35.84 12.00 
  
     SS 
      








      SS 
       
   df      
BFNE 
    MS 
 
   F 
 
 ηp2 
Group 27789.52      2 13894.76   66.18* .39 10385.92       2 5192.96 54.52* .35 
Error 43460.85  207     209.96   19717.55   207     95.25   
Total 71250.37  209    30103.47   209    









significantly higher on the IUS than the CTRL group, while the SIAS+SPS group also scored 
significantly higher than the SIAS/SPS Only group. A similar ANOVA with FNE as the 
dependent variable produced a statistically significant result, F(2,63) = 21.08, p < .001. Post hoc 
analyses showed that the SIAS+SPS group and the SIAS/SPS Only group reported significantly 
greater fear of negative evaluation on the BFNE-2 than the CTRL group, while the SIAS+SPS 
group also reported greater fear of negative evaluation than the SIAS/SPS Only group, p < .05.  
Hypothesis 3 – Do interpretations of ambiguous social information and accuracy beliefs 
differ between clinical groups?   
It was predicted that participants who met or exceeded the clinical cut-off scores for both 
the SPS and the SIAS, and those who met or exceeded the clinical cut-off scores for only SIAS 
or SPS, will 1) rank negative interpretations of ambiguous social situations on the ASSIQ as 
more likely to come to mind quickly and 2) report greater belief in the accuracy of the negative 
interpretations than control participants. Moreover, those who met or exceeded the clinical cut-
off scores for both measures of anxiety were hypothesized to 1) rank negative interpretations of 
ambiguous social situations as more likely to come to mind and 2) report greater belief in the 
accuracy of those interpretations than those exceeding the cut-off scores for only one measure of 
social anxiety. A one-way ANOVA with group (SIAS+SPS, SIAS/SPS Only, CTRL) as the 
independent variable and ASSIQ ranking scores as the dependent variable revealed significant 
group differences, F(2, 63) = 15.55, p < .001). Scheffe´ multiple comparisons test indicated that 
participants who met/exceeded the clinical cut-off scores for both the SPS and the SIAS, and 
those who met/exceeded the clinical cut-off scores for only SIAS or SPS, ranked negative 
interpretations of ambiguous social scenarios as more likely to spring to mind than the CTRL 
group, p ≤ .001. However, no differences in ranking scores were found between those who 




met/exceeded cut-off scores on both measures of social anxiety and those who met/exceeded cut-
off scores on only one measure, p = .78.  
A second one-way ANOVA with group (SIAS+SPS, SIAS/SPS Only, CTRL) as the 
independent variable and ASSIQ ratings of belief as the dependent variable confirmed the latter 
part of the hypothesis, F(2, 63) = 9.68, p < .001. Results from post-hoc analyses showed that the 
SIAS+SPS group and the SIAS/SPS Only group provided significantly higher ratings of belief in 
negative interpretations of ambiguous situations than the CTRL group, p ≤ .001. No differences 
in belief ratings were found between the SIAS+SPS group and the SIAS/SPS Only group, p = 
.71. As expected, no significant group differences were found with respect to ratings of belief in 
interpretations of control situations, F(2, 63) = .47, p = .63.     
Hypothesis 4 - Do interpretations of ambiguous vignette items and picture items differ 
between clinical groups?  
 The fourth hypothesis stated that the SIAS+SPS group and the SIAS/SPS Only group will 
1) rate ambiguous interpersonal items on the Social Vignette and Judgment Questionnaire more 
negatively and 2) rate ambiguous pictures but not positive, negative, or neutral pictures on the 
APRT as less pleasant than the CTRL group. Further, the SIAS+SPS group was hypothesized to 
1) rate ambiguous interpersonal items more negatively and 2) rate ambiguous pictures but not 
positive, negative, or neutral pictures as less pleasant than the SIAS/SPS Only group. No 
differences between groups were expected on items of the Social Vignette and Judgment 
Questionnaire requiring disambiguation of non-personal events. A one-way ANOVA with group 
(SIAS+SPS, SIAS/SPS Only, CTRL) as the independent variable and ratings of ambiguous 
interpersonal events as the dependent variable indicated a statistically significant group 
difference, F(2, 63) = 5.57, p < .01. Scheffe´ multiple comparisons test indicated that participants  






ANOVA Results and Descriptive Statistics for ASSIQ Ranking Scores and Belief Ratings by Type of Clinical Group 
 
 Ranking Scores 
       n                M                SD 
 Belief Ratings 
             n                M                 SD 
1. Does not meet cutoff score 43 1.48 .41 43  2.92  1.39 
2. Meets or exceeds cutoff 
score for one measure 12 2.04 .52 12 4.40  1.79 
3. Meets or exceeds cutoff 
score for both measures 
11 2.16 .43 11 4.93  1.86 
Total 66 1.69 .52 66 3.53  1.74 
  
        
        SS 
      
   
 df             










       
      SS 
       
     
    df      
   Belief 
  Ratings 
     MS 
 
    




Group   5.84    2 2.92 15.55* .33   46.50      2 23.25 9.68* .24 
Error 11.84  63       .19   151.25 63   2.40   
Total 17.68  65    197.74 65    
Note: For the rankings data, a higher score indicates that the negative interpretation is more likely to come to  
mind quickly.   
* p < .001 
 






ANOVA Results and Descriptive Statistics for Social Vignette & Judgment Questionnaire Scores by Type of Clinical Group  
 
     Interpersonal Events 
       n                M                 SD 
   Non-personal Events 
             n                M                 SD 
1. Does not meet cutoff score 43 5.05 .90 43 3.74 .73 
2. Meets or exceeds cutoff 
score for one measure 12 4.33 .95 12 3.53 .78 
3. Meets or exceeds cutoff 
score for both measures 
11 4.18 1.08 11 3.40 .76 
Total 66 4.77 1.00 66 3.64 .75 
  
        
        SS 
      
   











       
      SS 
       
     
   df      
Non-personal 
Events 
       MS 
 





Group   4.96    2 2.48 5.57* .15*   1.21      2        .61         1.09         .03 
Error 28.02  63        .45   35.07 63        .56   
Total 32.98  65    36.29 65    
* p < .01 
 




who met/exceeded the clinical cut-off scores for both anxiety subtypes, and those who 
met/exceeded the clinical cut-off scores for only one anxiety subtype, interpreted ambiguous 
interpersonal events in a more negative fashion than those who did not meet any clinical cut-offs,  
p < .05. No differences in vignette ratings were found between the SIAS+SPS group and the 
SIAS/SPS Only group, p = .64. As predicted, no significant group differences were found with 
respect to ratings of non-personal events, F(2, 63) = 1.09, p = .34. To test the latter part of the 
hypothesis, four one-way ANOVAs were performed with group (SIAS+SPS, SIAS/SPS Only, 
CTRL) as the independent variable and ambiguous picture ratings, positive picture ratings, 
negative picture ratings, and neutral picture ratings as the dependent variables, respectively. The 
groups did not differ in pleasantness ratings of ambiguous pictures [F(2, 63) = .49, p = .62], 
positive pictures [F(2, 63) = .12, p = .89], negative pictures [F(2, 63) = 2.46, p = .09], or neutral 
pictures [F(2, 63) = .86, p = .43].   
Hypothesis 5 - Do fear of negative evaluation and negative interpretations explain the 
relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social anxiety?  
 Mediation models were conducted using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2012) to 
examine whether fear of negative evaluation and negative interpretations of ambiguous social 
information serve as mediators of the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social 
anxiety. Participants’ scores on the IUS were entered as the independent variable (X) in the 
mediation model, BFNE-2 scores, ASSIQ ranking scores, ASSIQ belief ratings, and ratings of 
ambiguous interpersonal events on the social vignette were entered as proposed mediators (M), 
and measures of social anxiety were entered as the dependent variable (Y). Separate models were 
tested for each measure of social anxiety (i.e., SIAS and SPS).  




Models were estimated using a bootstrapping approach (Hayes, 2013), which is a 
nonparametric procedure that involves repeatedly sampling random observations with 
replacement from the dataset and estimating the indirect effect in each resampled dataset. 
Repeating this process thousands of times builds an empirical approximation of the sampling 
distribution of ab, which is then used to construct confidence intervals for the indirect effect. 
Following the logic of confidence intervals, if the estimated indirect effect overlaps with the 
value of zero, then the data suggest that the indirect effect is not statistically different from zero. 
This approach was selected over conventional methods for testing mediation, such as the causal 
steps strategy (Baron & Kenny, 1986) and the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982), due to the inherent 
limitations imposed by the latter group of tests and the prevailing opinion in the literature that 
data should be analyzed with bootstrapping to obtain the optimal estimate of the indirect effect 
(especially when working with small datasets). As outlined by Hayes (2013), the causal steps 
approach is not based on formal quantification or statistical testing of the indirect effect, it has 
been found to exhibit below-expected Type I error rates, as well as to suffer from very low 
power resulting from the use of multiple comparison tests. Since the sampling distribution of ab 
is normal only in large samples, methodologists have moreover expressed concern about using 
the standard normal distribution to derive a p value for the indirect effect via the Sobel test. In 
contrast, the bootstrapping approach does not impose the assumption of normality of the 
sampling distribution, it provides a direct test of the indirect effect, and it has higher power while 
maintaining reasonable control over the Type I error rate.    
Using the bootstrapping procedure, four mediation analyses were computed (for each of 
the SIAS and SPS), with fear of negative evaluation scores, ASSIQ ranking scores, ASSIQ belief 
ratings, and ratings on the social vignette as the mediators. Specifically, the relationship between 




intolerance of uncertainty (X) and social interaction anxiety (Y) was examined for an indirect 
effect (ab) mediated from intolerance of uncertainty (X) to fear of negative evaluation (M, path 
a) and subsequently from fear of negative evaluation (M) to social interaction anxiety (Y, path b). 
As seen in Figure 1, the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty (X) and social interaction 
anxiety (Y) was similarly examined for an indirect effect (ab) mediated from intolerance of 
uncertainty (X) to interpretations of ambiguous social information (M, path a), and then from 
interpretations of ambiguous social information (M) to social interaction anxiety (Y, path b). In 
keeping with Hayes’ (2013) recommendations, mediation was established by using a bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab) based on 10,000 bootstrap 
samples, where confidence intervals that do not include zero provide 95% confidence that the 
indirect effect is statistically significant. 
Results of the first analysis indicated that fear of negative evaluation mediated the 
relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social interaction anxiety (SIAS scores).  
Participants who reported higher intolerance of uncertainty experienced greater fear of negative 
evaluation (a = .51), and participants who reported greater fear of negative evaluation 
experienced higher levels of social interaction anxiety (b = .46). The 95% confidence interval for 
this indirect effect (ab = .24) was significant as the confidence interval did not include zero (.10 
to .38). However, there continued to be a significant effect of intolerance of uncertainty on social 
interaction anxiety independent of its effect on fear of negative evaluation (c' = .35, p < .01). The 
second analysis revealed that interpretations of ambiguous social information (as reflected by 
ASSIQ ranking scores) mediated the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social 
interaction anxiety. Participants who experienced higher intolerance of uncertainty reported 
negative interpretations of ambiguous social situations as more likely to come to mind quickly (a 




= .01), and participants who reported negative interpretations of ambiguous social situations as 
more likely to come to mind quickly experienced greater levels of social interaction anxiety (b = 
6.54). The 95% confidence interval for this indirect effect (ab = .09) was significant as the 
confidence interval did not include zero (.02 to .18). A significant effect of intolerance of 
uncertainty on social interaction anxiety remained apparent independent of its effect on negative 
interpretations of ambiguous social situations (c' = .49, p < .01). An indirect effect of intolerance 
of uncertainty on social interaction anxiety was also modeled through belief in the accuracy of 
negative interpretations of ambiguous social information (ab). Since the value of zero lied within 
the confidence interval range for this indirect effect, the indirect effect was non-significant. 
Finally, interpretations of ambiguous interpersonal events on the Social Vignette/Judgment 
Questionnaire mediated the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social interaction 
anxiety. Participants who reported greater intolerance of uncertainty interpreted ambiguous 
interpersonal events in the social vignette more negatively (a = -.01), and participants who 
interpreted ambiguous interpersonal events in a more negative fashion experienced greater levels 
of social interaction anxiety (b = -3.97). The 95% confidence interval for this indirect effect (ab 
= .05) was significant as it did not include the value of zero (-.19 to -.06). Intolerance of 
uncertainty continued to have a significant effect on social interaction anxiety independent of its 
effect on negative interpretations of ambiguous interpersonal events (c' = .53, p < .01).   
With respect to performance anxiety (SPS scores), results from the fifth analysis showed 
that fear of negative evaluation mediated the association between intolerance of uncertainty and 
performance anxiety. Participants who reported higher intolerance of uncertainty experienced 
greater fear of negative evaluation (a = .51), and participants who reported greater fear of 
negative evaluation experienced higher levels of performance anxiety (b = .47). The 95% 




confidence interval for this indirect effect (ab = .24) was significant as the confidence interval 
did not include zero (.09 to .40). Once again, there continued to be a significant effect of 
intolerance of uncertainty on performance anxiety independent of its effect on fear of negative 
evaluation (c' = .37, p < .01). Indirect effects of intolerance of uncertainty on performance 
anxiety were also modeled through ASSIQ ranking scores (ab), ASSIQ belief ratings (ab), and 
ratings of ambiguous interpersonal events on the Social Vignette/Judgment Questionnaire (ab). 
The value of zero lied within the confidence interval range for these three indirect effects, 
thereby rendering them non-significant.  
Discussion 
 The purpose of this study was threefold: 1) to examine whether intolerance of uncertainty 
contributes any significant variance in social anxiety severity above and beyond that accounted 
for by fear of negative evaluation, anxiety sensitivity, interpretation bias, and depression; 2) to 
investigate whether different clinical groups exhibit greater levels of intolerance of uncertainty 
and a greater tendency to interpret ambiguous social stimuli (lexical and pictorial) in a negative 
manner in comparison to individuals who do not meet the clinical cut-offs for social anxiety; and 
to examine whether negative interpretations of ambiguous social information mediate the 
relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social anxiety. 
The results of the correlation analyses demonstrated significant interrelationships 
between all of the variables of interest and in theoretically congruent directions. For example, 
intolerance of uncertainty was strongly associated with social anxiety, fear of negative evaluation 
was likewise highly correlated with social anxiety, while social anxiety was strongly associated 
with negative interpretations of ambiguous social events. These results are in accordance with 
growing research indicating a relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social anxiety 




(Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Carleton et al., 2010; Carleton et al., 2007; Whiting et al., 2014), fear 
of negative evaluation and social anxiety (Carleton, Collimore, McCabe, & Antony, 2011; Clark, 
2001; Nichols, 1974; Winton et al., 1995), as well as negative interpretation bias and social 
anxiety (Amir et al., 1998; Constans et al., 1999; Kanai et al., 2009; Moser et al., 2012, Yoon 
and Zinbarg, 2008).  
Intolerance of Uncertainty and Social Anxiety? 
The first hypothesis that intolerance of uncertainty will uniquely explain additional 
variance in social anxiety scores after controlling for fear of negative evaluation, anxiety 
sensitivity, and depression was supported. Regression analyses indicated a significant 
relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social interaction anxiety as measured by the 
SIAS, independent of all other variables and similar to the precedent results from Carleton et al. 
(2007) and Boelen and Reijntjes (2009). Boelen and Reijntjes’ (2009) results indicated that 
uncertainty intolerance accounted for a significant additional 4% of the variance in social anxiety 
severity when controlling for neuroticism, fear of negative evaluation, and anxiety sensitivity, 
whereas Carleton et al. (2007) similarly found that intolerance of uncertainty continued to 
account for a statistically significant amount of the variance (4%) above and beyond negative 
affect, positive affect, fear of negative evaluation, and the anxiety sensitivity-based fear of 
socially observable anxiety symptoms. In the current study, intolerance of uncertainty accounted 
for a smaller yet significant 2.3% of variability in social interaction anxiety severity after 
adjusting for fear of negative evaluation, anxiety sensitivity, and depression, and it was also a 
significant predictor of change in SIAS scores. The second regression analysis revealed a 
significant, albeit miniscule relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and performance 
anxiety as measured by the SPS, independent of all other variables. That is, intolerance of 




uncertainty accounted for a small additional .01% of variability and it was a significant predictor 
of change in SPS scores. These results along with previously reported findings suggest that the 
inability to tolerate the uncertainty associated with social situations may be a critical element in 
the development and maintenance of social anxiety symptoms. 
  Although the independent contribution of uncertainty intolerance to observed variance 
was rather small in this study, it should be acknowledged that this may be due to its entry in the 
final step of the regression analyses rather than its actual role in social anxiety. Since intolerance 
of uncertainty overlapped with the other variables in the study and was entered last, the shared 
variance with the other variables was removed and what was examined is only the unique 
variance explained by the construct that was not shared with the other predictor variables. Not 
only did the hierarchical regressions in the study involve several strongly correlated independent 
variables, but they were also run on a relatively small sample, which may have further prevented 
a more robust finding for the construct. Had the order of entry for the variables in this study also 
been reversed, intolerance of uncertainty may have demonstrated a substantial contribution to 
variance in social anxiety scores, possibly greater than the one observed with the other variables. 
To illustrate, even though Carleton et al. (2007) found that intolerance of uncertainty explained 
an additional 4% of the variance in social anxiety severity above and beyond the other variables 
under investigation, they also found that the inhibitory anxiety subscale of the IUS accounted for 
51% of the variance in social anxiety scores when the order of entry for the independent 
variables was reversed and intolerance of uncertainty scores were entered in the first step of their 
regression. This amount was greater than the variance accounted for by fear of negative 
evaluation (47%) when it was entered first in the previous analysis. Whiting et al. (2013) 
similarly found that IUS scores accounted for 20% of the variance in social interaction anxiety 




scores and 32% of the variance in performance anxiety scores when it was entered first. Finally, 
although the mediating effect of uncertainty intolerance was not the aim of this investigation, it 
should be noted that past research using the same measures in this study (IUS, SIAS, SPS) has 
shown it to have mediated the relationship between neuroticism and symptoms of social anxiety, 
which is arguably further evidence for its salient role in this phenomenon (McEvoy & Mahoney, 
2012).          
Intolerance of Uncertainty and Fear of Negative Evaluation Between Clinical Groups   
The second hypothesis stated that participants who met or exceeded the clinical cut-off 
scores for both the SPS and the SIAS, and those who met or exceeded the clinical cut-off scores 
for only SIAS or SPS, will report greater IU and FNE than will those who did not exceed any 
cut-offs. Further, those who met or exceeded the clinical cut-off scores for both the SPS and the 
SIAS were hypothesized to experience greater IU and FNE than those exceeding the cut-off 
scores for only SIAS or SPS. This hypothesis was confirmed. Participants who met or exceeded 
the clinical cut-off scores for both the SPS and the SIAS, and those who met or exceeded the 
clinical cut-off scores for only one measure of social anxiety experienced greater IU and FNE 
than control participants. Individuals who met or exceeded the cut-off scores for both social 
anxiety measures moreover reported greater IU and FNE than those who were in the clinical 
range on only one measure of social anxiety. Intolerance of uncertainty thus seems to have an 
additive and specific effect on social anxiety severity, with increasing levels of IU corresponding 
with more intensified symptoms of social anxiety—a finding that adds to earlier studies by 
showing that IU is not only specific for GAD and OCD, but is also specifically related to social 
anxiety (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2008; Carleton et al., 2009; McEvoy, & Mahoney, 2012).  




This finding is consistent with that of Whiting et al. (2014), who discovered that 
individuals who exceeded the clinical cut-off scores for both subtypes experienced greater 
intolerance of uncertainty than individuals high in only one social anxiety subtype or neither, 
suggesting an additive effect of intolerance of uncertainty in the presence of both anxiety 
subtypes (i.e., social interaction anxiety and performance anxiety). The results from the present 
study also echo the findings of Carleton et al. (2010), whose comparisons across different 
symptom groups suggested that there were differences in IU levels between persons with a 
probable diagnosis of SAD, GAD, neither, or both disorders. Participants who reported SAD and 
GAD symptoms well below levels reported by those meeting diagnostic criteria for either 
disorder reported IU levels significantly lower than participants reporting symptoms congruent 
with diagnoses of either or both SAD and GAD. Moreover, participants reporting symptoms 
consistent with both SAD and GAD experienced significantly higher levels of IU than all other 
groups. These results in conjunction with the current study’s findings contribute to the growing 
body of literature suggesting that IU may be a fundamental, transdiagnostic component of 
several anxiety disorders. The present study moreover provides novel evidence that IU levels 
additively contribute to anxiety symptom severity as measured by whether one meets criteria for 
one or both subtypes of social anxiety. 
Interpretations of Ambiguous Social Information and Accuracy Beliefs  
 The third hypothesis predicted that participants who met or exceeded the clinical cut-off 
scores for both the SPS and the SIAS, and those who met or exceeded the clinical cut-off scores 
for only SIAS or SPS, will 1) rank negative interpretations of ambiguous social situations on the 
ASSIQ as more likely to come to mind quickly and 2) report greater belief in the accuracy of the 
negative interpretations than nonanxious participants. Moreover, those who met or exceeded the 




clinical cut-off scores for both measures of anxiety were hypothesized to 1) rank negative 
interpretations of ambiguous social situations as more likely to come to mind and 2) report 
greater belief in the accuracy of those interpretations than those exceeding the cut-off scores for 
only one measure of social anxiety. The former but not the latter part of this hypothesis was 
confirmed. Participants with both anxiety subtypes and participants with one anxiety subtype 
indeed ranked negative interpretations of ambiguous social scenarios as more likely to spring to 
mind than did control participants. However, participants with both anxiety subtypes did not rank 
the negative interpretations as more likely to come to mind than participants with only one 
anxiety subtype, suggesting that negative thoughts/interpretations of ambiguous social 
information are likely to more automatically come to mind in those with social anxiety 
irrespective of the severity or specificity of their symptoms. Participants with both anxiety 
subtypes and those with only one anxiety subtype also reported greater belief in the accuracy of 
the negative interpretations than control participants; however, there was once again no 
difference between those with both anxiety subtypes and those with one anxiety subtype in 
beliefs about the accuracy of the negative interpretations. In other words, regardless of the 
severity of social anxiety symptoms, individuals who experience social anxiety are more likely to 
interpret ambiguous social situations in a negative fashion and more likely to believe these 
interpretations. In contrast to intolerance of uncertainty, which demonstrated an additive effect 
across the different levels of social anxiety, the stable tendency to appraise ambiguous social 
events negatively irrespective of anxiety severity level entails that negative interpretation bias is 
a core cognitive appraisal process that may be more inflexible and difficult to modify than 
uncertainty intolerance. The fact that the preference for negative interpretations of ambiguous 
scenarios persisted despite the availability of alternative, neutral explanations moreover suggests 




that the observed negative interpretation bias does not reflect deficits in retrieval of neutral 
information. It rather implies that in individuals with social anxiety, ambiguous social scenarios 
are construed as negative, thus priming a negative interpretation and overriding a neutral (or 
positive) one. 
 The ambiguous situation interpretation data in the present study are highly consistent 
with those reported by Stopa and Clark (2000) in their investigation of social phobia and 
interpretation of social events. Using the same version of the ASSIQ that was administered in the 
current study, they found that that patients with social phobia ranked negative interpretations of 
ambiguous social scenarios as more likely to come to mind, and they were more likely to believe 
these interpretations than did non-patients. The specificity of this interpretation bias for 
ambiguous social scenarios was demonstrated by Amir, Foa, and Coles (1998), who presented 
patients with both self-relevant and other-relevant (i.e., related to a ‘typical person’) ambiguous 
social and non-social scenarios. They found that, in comparison to patients with OCD and non-
anxious controls, individuals with social phobia were more likely to make negative 
interpretations of ambiguous social events despite the availability of alternative positive 
interpretations. Moreover, the interpretive bias only occurred when they were presented with 
self-relevant social scenarios.  
The results of the present investigation are also reflected in the study by Kanai et al. 
(2009), wherein individuals with high levels of social anxiety and non-anxious controls were 
asked to give a four minute anxiety-provoking speech to a confederate of the opposite sex who 
performed various ambiguous behaviors. It was found that individuals with high social anxiety 
interpreted the ambiguous behaviours of other people in a more negative and threatening manner 
and in a less neutral manner than did non-anxious participants, and this negative interpretation 




bias remained even after controlling for depression levels. Finally, the present study’s findings 
complement the results of Moser et al.’s (2008) investigation using event-related brain potentials 
(ERPs) to examine interpretation bias for ambiguous social scenarios by recording P600 data 
from non-anxious and high-anxious participants. In contrast to non-anxious controls, ERP data 
from high socially anxious individuals revealed no difference in P600 amplitude between 
positive and negative terminal words in ambiguous scenarios, suggesting the absence of a 
positive interpretation bias and the likely presence of a negative bias in these individuals. In sum, 
the finding that participants with social anxiety (regardless of severity level) ranked negative 
interpretations as more likely to come to mind and had greater belief in the accuracy of the 
negative interpretations than control participants, adds to the body of literature indicating a 
biased interpretation of ambiguous social information in social anxiety.  
Interpretations of Ambiguous Social Vignette Items and APRT Picture Items  
It was hypothesized that participants who met or exceeded the clinical cut-off scores for 
both the SPS and the SIAS, and those who met or exceeded the clinical cut-off scores for only 
SIAS or SPS, will 1) rate ambiguous interpersonal items on the Social Vignette and Judgment 
Questionnaire more negatively and 2) rate ambiguous pictures but not positive, negative, or 
neutral pictures on the APRT as less pleasant than non-anxious participants. Further, the 
SIAS+SPS group was hypothesized to 1) rate ambiguous interpersonal items more negatively 
and 2) rate ambiguous pictures but not positive, negative, or neutral pictures as less pleasant than 
participants with only one anxiety subtype. Once again, the hypothesis was partially confirmed. 
Regardless of social anxiety severity (one versus both subtypes), participants with social anxiety 
interpreted ambiguous interpersonal items more negatively than non-anxious control participants. 
The expected absence of group differences in interpretations of non-personal events indicates 




that socially-anxious participants did not uniformly rate all ambiguous events as more negative. 
This discrimination between personal and non-personal items suggests content specificity in the 
interpretation biases of those with social anxiety and consequently rules out possible response 
bias explanations.  
This finding is in agreement with those reported by Constans et al. (1999), who similarly 
administered the Social Vignette and Judgment Questionnaire to high socially anxious 
participants and non-anxious controls, and found that socially-anxious participants showed more 
negative interpretations of ambiguous, interpersonal events when compared with their non-
anxious counterparts. The groups in their study also failed to differ on items measuring 
interpretations of non-personal events, thereby demonstrating content specificity in the observed 
interpretation bias. The current study’s finding of a specific negative interpretation bias for social 
scenarios using a vignette methodology is also congruent with the aforementioned findings from 
Amir et al. (1998), who found that compared to non-anxious individuals, individuals with 
generalized social phobia favored negative interpretations for ambiguous social scenarios but not 
non-social scenarios.  
Contrary to expectation, there were no significant differences between groups with 
respect to their appraisals of ambiguous pictures, nor with appraisals of neutral, positive, or 
negative pictures. This finding stands in contrast to the overall literature discussed thus far 
showing that elevated anxiety leads to biased processing and interpretation of ambiguous social 
material. It is moreover inconsistent with previous studies that have employed pictorial stimuli to 
examine interpretation bias and discovered that individuals with moderate to high levels of social 
anxiety endorsed threatening interpretations for ambiguous facial expressions (Winton et al., 
1995; Yoon and Zinbarg, 2007).  




The decision to administer the affective picture rating task was influenced by well-known 
knowledge that the basic fear in social anxiety is about being negatively evaluated by others 
(APA, 2013). Since facial expression and body language are important ways of conveying 
evaluation, pictures of human faces and human social interaction would be expected to serve as 
somewhat ecologically valid stimuli for research on disambiguation bias related to social 
anxiety. However, an image of a face or social interaction is certainly not the same as a person 
with whom we are interacting and, thus, the images presented in the APRT may have been less 
ecologically valid than the linguistic content of the online and paper-based questionnaires. 
Indeed, this may be why the bulk of research demonstrating the association between anxiety and 
the tendency to appraise neutral/ambiguous events more negatively, has employed social 
vignettes, diary-like tasks or social interactions, but not digital photographs (e.g., Alden, Taylor, 
Mellings, & Laposa, 2008; Butler & Mathews, 1983; Constans et al., 1999; Kanai et al., 2010; 
Stopa & Clark, 2000). It is possible that the ability to imagine oneself in the situation is 
necessary for a socially anxious individual to appraise the ambiguous event as more negative or 
threatening compared to a non-anxious individual. Viewing photographs of others or viewing 
unfamiliar scenes may have prevented participants from being able to experience the image as 
though it were occurring to them. The pictures in the APRT, which were selected from a set of 
normative emotional stimuli made available by the International Affective Picture System in 
1991, moreover contained somewhat outdated content which may not have resonated with 
participants today. It has also been proposed that cognitive processing biases are most evident for 
self-relevant situations (Rosmarin, Bourque, Antony, & McCabe, 2009). Conceivably, had 
idiographic images been used wherein the individual views pictures of familiar and personally-
relevant scenes, different results may have emerged on the affective picture task.  




Do fear of negative evaluation and negative interpretations explain the relationship 
between intolerance of uncertainty and social anxiety?  
 The final hypothesis predicted that fear of negative evaluation and negative 
interpretations would explain the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social 
anxiety. As expected, fear of negative evaluation mediated the association between intolerance of 
uncertainty and social interaction anxiety scores, as well as the association between intolerance 
of uncertainty and performance anxiety scores. The finding is consistent with the cognitive 
model of social anxiety proposed by Clark (2001), which was discussed earlier. Intolerance of 
uncertainty about the possibility of being negatively judged by others, making a bad impression, 
or acting in a way that could be embarrassing, may lead to a fear of such negative evaluation. 
This fear of negative evaluation leads the individual to perceive social situations as inherently 
dangerous or threatening. An individual’s assumption that the audience in a particular social 
situation is likely to evaluate them negatively and that such an evaluation will result in dire 
consequences then induces anxiety or apprehension experienced in interpersonal or performance 
situations. The distress associated with the anxiety results in attempts to reduce it through a 
variety of safety behaviors (e.g., wearing cosmetics to conceal blushing), which have the 
counterproductive effect of increasing self-focused attention and self-monitoring while reducing 
attention to and processing of others’ objective behaviour. This, in turn serves to maintain one’s 
negative self-image and social anxiety in feared situations (Clark & Wells, 1995). 
 With respect to the latter part of the hypothesis, negative interpretations of ambiguous 
social information on the ASSIQ and negative interpretations of ambiguous interpersonal events 
on the Social Vignette/Judgment Questionnaire were found to mediate the relationship between 
intolerance of uncertainty and social interaction anxiety. Participants who experienced higher 




intolerance of uncertainty reported more negative interpretations of ambiguous social situations 
and greater levels of social interaction anxiety. One possible explanation for this finding is that 
individuals with social interaction anxiety are so distressed by uncertainty about the possible 
meaning or consequences of ambiguous social information, that they automatically (and 
biasedly) interpret the information negatively in order to experience a swift reduction in distress. 
Indeed, this explanation is consistent with literature indicating that individuals with OCD engage 
in checking behaviors to regain a sense of certainty and with Koerner and Dugas’ (2006) finding 
that individuals with GAD were so distressed by uncertainty that they would prefer a certain 
negative outcome to an uncertain one. These findings overall also lend support to the notion that 
intolerance of uncertainty is a transdiagnostic factor that manifests itself differently across 
anxiety disorders.  
 Within the context of social anxiety, and in keeping with Clark’s (2001) cognitive theory, 
intolerance of uncertainty might come into play during pre-processing of an anxiogenic event, 
during the actual anxiety-inducing event, and during post-event processing. If intolerance of 
uncertainty is conceptualized as a cognitive bias that leads to anxiety, as proposed by Dugas et 
al. (2004), then one would expect it to be associated with specific information processing biases 
that occur prior to, during, and following a social situation and that are conducive to the 
development or persistence of social anxiety. Given that social situations are inherently 
ambiguous and ill-defined, high socially anxious persons may be more likely to generate 
negative interpretations of ambiguous social information than individuals with low or no social 
anxiety. As suggested by Clark (2001), the negative interpretation of social cues as signs of 
disapproval may be a consequence of misapplying a rule about one to one interactions.  




Particularly prior to and during the feared social event, the negative interpretations are 
likely to have a direct anxiety-inducing effect by increasing the perceived danger and possible 
negative consequences of the social situation. Due to this increased perceived danger and fear of 
negative consequences, individuals with social anxiety are likely to engage in the 
aforementioned safety-seeking behaviors which could adversely affect other people's response to 
them (Curtis & Miller, 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). That is, they may 
draw others’ attention to the individual with social anxiety and influence others’ behaviour in a 
way that confirms the fears and assumptions held by the socially anxious person (Clark & 
McManus, 2002). Moreover, the negative interpretations of social events are likely to undermine 
individuals’ perceived self-efficacy and increase the subjective probability of adverse outcomes 
in future social interactions (Stopa & Clark, 2000). The likely consequence of this sequence of 
experiences may be an increased tendency to avoid social situations in the future.   
Although it was found that negative interpretations of ambiguous social information 
mediated the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social interaction anxiety, no 
such mediating effect was found for beliefs in the accuracy of negative interpretations of 
ambiguous social information. Moreover, negative interpretations on the ASSIQ, belief in the 
accuracy of negative interpretations, and interpretations of ambiguous interpersonal events on the 
Social Vignette did not mediate the association between intolerance of uncertainty and 
performance anxiety. It may be that interpretation bias is more salient in anxiety which occurs in 
contingent interactions, wherein individuals must continually process and be responsive to the 
ambiguous social cues of others, rather than noncontingent interactions wherein individuals are 
performing some preplanned material before others. However, this explanation fails to echo the 
rest of the current study’s results, particularly the finding that regardless of the severity of social 




anxiety symptoms (one versus both subtypes), individuals who experience social anxiety are 
more likely to interpret ambiguous social situations in a negative fashion and more likely to 
believe these interpretations. A more likely explanation for the failure to find the 
abovementioned mediating effects involves the absolute Type II error rate of the bootstrapping 
analysis employed. For example, MacKinnon, Lockwood, and Williams (2004) found that the 
“best case” Type II error rate for bootstrapping averaged across various effect size conditions 
with N = 100 was .38, which is considerably greater than the recommended Type II error rate of 
.20 (corresponding to statistical power of 0.80; Cohen, 1992). Thus, the fact that a rather small 
subsample size of 66 participants was utilized to perform the bootstrapping analyses may have 
resulted in a failure to detect a mediating effect that actually exists.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The present study had several limitations. Firstly, the sample of participants was 
comprised exclusively of undergraduate students (the majority of whom were Caucasian), and as 
such the results may not be generalizable to members of the general population. Secondly, while 
power to detect effects was adequate for the first four hypotheses, power was arguably not 
sufficient for the fifth set of hypotheses. Specifically, no mediating effect of negative 
interpretation bias on the association between uncertainty intolerance and performance anxiety 
was detected. To detect the presence of an indirect effect at the broadly recommended threshold 
of 80% power with a medium sized effect, a sample size of at least 71 is recommended (Fritz & 
MacKinnon, 2007). Notable methodologists such as Shrout and Bolger (2002. p. 424), however, 
have suggested that bootstrapping “can be applied even when sample sizes are moderate or 
small, that is, in the range of 20 - 80 cases,” and advocacy for this practice has been sustained by 
similar recommendations from other researchers and methodologists such as Preacher and Hayes 




(2004). Nevertheless, it is possible that the sample size of 66 for the fifth set of hypotheses may 
have been insufficient to detect actual indirect effects, should they exist. Therefore, this 
hypothesized effect and the current negative interpretation findings will have to be confirmed in 
future experimental/longitudinal studies with larger samples. These studies can moreover 
consider computing ordinary least squares (OLS) regression-based path analysis where the 
relationships between the 4 mediators (or fear of negative evaluation and a measure of 
interpretation bias) are all modelled together. This would allow for an assessment of the shared 
variance within the mediation model, which is particularly useful given the shared variance 
among the related variables under investigation. 
Thirdly, no diagnostic information was collected from the current sample. There may 
have been important differences associated with participants who were formally diagnosed with 
SAD or another anxiety disorder and their responses to the variables measured in the current 
study. Indeed, the IU scores of participants who reported being high in social anxiety may have 
been the result of a clinical diagnosis of GAD, OCD, comorbid GAD/OCD, or GAD and/or OCD 
symptoms that were clinically significant even in the absence of a diagnosis. To rule out this 
possibility or control for such symptoms and possible comorbidity, future researchers would 
benefit from administering measures like the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire for 
DSM-IV (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002), the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; 
Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), and the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised 
Version (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). Given the accumulating evidence that IU might be a 
transdiagnostic mechanism that contributes to the maintenance of symptoms across anxiety 
disorders, this would be particularly important for the obtainment of valid data. Future 
researchers should also explore intolerance of uncertainty and interpretations of social ambiguity 




across diagnosed clinical samples, particularly persons with SAD. It may be helpful to consider 
including a measure of intolerance of uncertainty and negative interpretation bias as treatment 
outcome measures among persons treated for SAD to determine whether reductions in social 
anxiety symptoms correspond with reductions in levels of intolerance of uncertainty and negative 
interpretations of ambiguous events. Alternatively, researchers might examine whether targeted 
reductions in levels of intolerance of uncertainty and negative interpretations result in an 
amelioration of social anxiety symptoms, even in the absence of treatments targeting social 
anxiety.  
Recent research has begun to examine the value of incorporating interpretation 
modification paradigms, where individuals are trained to interpret ambiguous information in a 
more neutral manner as opposed to a threat-related manner, into treatments for anxiety in hopes 
of enhancing treatment efficacy (Beard & Amin, 2008; Brosan, Hoppitt, Shelfer, Sillence, & 
Mackintosh, 2011). Although this area of research is beginning to expand, it appears that the role 
of intolerance of uncertainty as a transdiagnostic cognitive processing bias with distinct 
manifestations in social anxiety has not received adequate research attention. Given that 
intolerance of uncertainty was shown to contribute to negative appraisals of ambiguous social 
information to come to mind more quickly among individuals with social anxiety, the role of this 
cognitive phenomenon as it relates to negative interpretation biases warrants inclusion in future 
investigations, particularly mediation research.  
One such avenue for future research pertains to the process by which intolerance of 
uncertainty may lead to or exacerbate the negative interpretations bias underlying social anxiety. 
While, as suggested by Clark (2001), the negative interpretation of social cues as signs of 
disapproval may be a consequence of misapplying a rule about one to one interactions, one may 




also surmise that intolerance of uncertainty engenders “What if…?” questions that result in a 
negative interpretation of the social cue or scenario. For instance, when anticipating a feared 
social situation such as giving a presentation to a group of strangers, the uncertainty of whether 
one will achieve their desired level of performance may result in questions such as “What if my 
mind goes blank in the middle of the presentation?,” “What if my face turns red while I’m 
talking?,” “What if I don’t know how to answer audience questions?,” or “What if they’ll think 
I’m not intelligent?” The uncertainty surrounding these questions and the possibility that one will 
not achieve their desired level of performance may be so distressing that the individual might 
attempt to resolve it, albeit maladaptively, by recalling past failures, generating negative images 
of themselves during the presentation, and by making other predictions of poor performance in 
front of the audience. Consequently, upon ultimately giving the presentation, the individual may 
already be in a self-focused processing mode defined by a reduced capacity to notice 
disconfirmatory evidence such as nodding and smiling, while simultaneously being more likely 
to notice and remember ambiguous cues (e.g., looking down at one’s notes) that are then 
interpreted in a negative manner.    
When a socially anxious individual finds themselves in a feared situation, intolerance of 
uncertainty might again come into play. Attempts to decipher or ruminate about the multiple 
possible meanings of an ambiguous social cue (e.g., an audience member occasionally breaking 
eye contact) in order to achieve certainty about whether that cue signifies approval or 
disapproval requires time and cognitive resources that one must allocate to the task at hand (i.e., 
the presentation). In other words, elaboration of the social material for the purpose of restoring a 
sense of certainty is not possible. This can arguably be said of virtually any social interaction. 
Since normal human communication demands cognitive resources to facilitate a well-timed 




exchange of verbal and non-verbal messages with relatively short pauses or hesitations, one does 
not have the available resources to simultaneously engage in elaboration and re-processing of the 
social information they are attending to in the moment. In the case of a socially anxious 
individual in a feared situation, the distressing uncertainty about the meaning of ambiguous 
social information accompanied by an inability to reprocess and elaborate the ambiguous 
material “online” may lead them to make a negative interpretation of the ambiguous material in 
order to restore a sense of certainty and reduce distress. The individual giving a presentation 
might therefore interpret breaking eye contact as an indicator that the audience member finds the 
presentation boring in order to impose some meaning on the ambiguity of their behaviour.  
Following the presentation, uncertainty about the meaning of the ambiguous social cues 
received during the presentation and the potential consequences of any perceived deviation from 
their desired level of performance may lead the socially anxious individual to embark on a 
painstaking review of the event, as suggested by Clark (2001). Given that the true meaning of 
ambiguous social cues such as looking down at one’s notes and breaking eye contact cannot be 
ascertained, the individual may be compelled to make an arbitrary appraisal of this information. 
Since the review is dominated by the individual’s negative self-impression, erroneous inferences 
about how they appear to others, and attempts to reduce the distressing uncertainty surrounding 
the ambiguous cues they received, they may be likely to negatively interpret the ambiguous 
social cues as signs of disapproval and to appraise their performance as much more negative than 
it truly was. As can be seen through this example, intolerance of uncertainty may play a crucial 
role in information processing prior to entering, during, and after leaving a feared social 
situation. This hypothesis should be explored in future research in order to ascertain the precise 
mechanisms by which this cognitive bias leads to or exacerbates negative interpretations of 




ambiguous information in social anxiety. Such examination should ideally occur within 
experimental and longitudinal designs that also take into account additional variables (e.g., 
attentional bias, fear of positive evaluation, anxiety sensitivity) that have been shown to maintain 
social anxiety.    
Conclusion  
 The results of this study indicate that an inability to tolerate the uncertainty associated 
with ambiguous social situations may be a critical element in the development and maintenance 
of social anxiety. They also add to the growing body of literature which has demonstrated that 
intolerance of uncertainty is a transdiagnostic feature across anxiety disorders. Regression 
analyses revealed that intolerance of uncertainty explained unique variance in social interaction 
and performance anxiety beyond fear of negative evaluation, anxiety sensitivity, and depression, 
while also being a significant predictor of social anxiety symptoms. Concerning its impact 
among different clinical groups, it was found to have an additive and specific effect on social 
anxiety severity, with increasing levels of uncertainty intolerance corresponding with more 
intensified symptoms of social anxiety. In contrast, a stable tendency to appraise ambiguous 
social events negatively irrespective of anxiety severity level was also found, suggesting that 
negative interpretation bias is a core cognitive appraisal process in social anxiety. To this 
author’s knowledge, no studies to date have explored a theoretical model wherein the 
relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social anxiety is mediated by fear of negative 
evaluation and negative interpretation bias. Results from bootstrapping analyses indicated that 
fear of negative evaluation mediated the association between intolerance of uncertainty and 
social interaction anxiety scores, as well as the association between uncertainty intolerance and 
social phobia scores. Additionally, negative interpretations of ambiguous social information were 




found to mediate the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social interaction 
anxiety, but not the relationship between uncertainty intolerance and performance anxiety.  
Future researchers should explore these variables across diagnosed clinical samples, particularly 
individuals with SAD, in larger experimental and longitudinal investigations. Finally, and on a 
clinical note, it is hoped that the current findings make apparent that one function of cognitive 
behavior therapy should be to not only enhance tolerance for uncertainty and decrease 
threatening interpretations, but also to shape a positive interpretation bias in individuals 
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Appendix A: Recruitment Mass Email - Pilot Session 
 
Dear Graduate Students,  
 
You are invited to participate in a brief pilot session testing a novel computerized measure of 
information processing in social anxiety—the Affective Picture Rating Task. The purpose of the 
session is to determine the validity and reliability of the instrument. The research is being 
conducted by myself under the supervision of Dr. Amanda Maranzan.  
 
If you choose to participate, you will be invited to complete one (1) twenty minute session in the 
Mental Health Research Lab. During the visit, you will view a number of photographs depicting 
various individuals and social scenarios. You will be asked to rate the pleasantness of each 
picture using a predetermined scale (via the keyboard) and to classify each picture into one of 
four discrete categories. 
 
Please contact me via email or by telephone (416-732-3911) and I will be happy to arrange a 
mutually agreeable date/time to complete the Affective Picture Rating Task. I am aware that 




Flavia Spiroiu   Dr. Amanda Maranzan  
fspiroiu@lakeheadu.ca  kamaranz@lakeheadu.ca  

























Appendix B: Participant Information Letter - Pilot Session 
 
Dear Prospective Participant,  
 
You are invited to participate in a brief pilot session testing a novel computerized measure of 
information processing in social anxiety—the Affective Picture Rating Task. The purpose of the 
session is to determine the validity and reliability of the instrument. The research is being 
conducted by Flavia Spiroiu (MA student) under the supervision of Dr. Amanda Maranzan 
(Psychology professor).  
 
Description of the Study 
 
The session will consist of one twenty minute visit to the Mental Health Research Lab. During 
the laboratory visit, you will view a number of photographs depicting various individuals and 
social scenarios. You will be asked to rate the pleasantness of each picture using a predetermined 
scale (via the keyboard) and to classify each picture into one of four discrete categories. 
 
Potential Risks or Discomforts 
 
There is minimal risk involved if you agree to participate in this session. You understand that 
you may experience some discomfort while viewing some of the pictures. You have the right to 
refuse or discontinue participation at any time.  
 
Potential Benefits of the Pilot Study to You or Others 
 
It is possible that you will not receive any direct benefits from participating in this session. 
However, you may develop a better understanding of research methodology, and your 




To ensure your anonymity, your data will be assigned a number at the beginning of the session 
and all of the data for you will be coded under this number. Thus, all your responses to the 
affective picture rating task and all computer files that contain the data you generate will be 
associated with the assigned number and not with your identity. The informed consent agreement 
will be stored in a locked storage space in the Mental Health Research Lab. The researcher 
conducting the study and the supervisor will be the sole individuals with access to the collected 
data. The data will be will be retained for 5 years, after which point it will be destroyed by secure 
and confidential disposal. Only group findings will be reported in publications and presentations 
arising from this research.  
 
 




Voluntary Nature of Participation 
Participation in this session is voluntary. Your choice of whether or not to participate will not 
influence your future relations with Lakehead University. If you decide to participate, you are 
free to withdraw your consent and to stop your participation at any time. Your right to withdraw 
your consent also applies to our use of your data. Should you decide that you do not want us to 
retain or analyze data that you have provided during the session, please feel free to notify us. If at 
any point during or after this session you would like to speak to a mental health professional, feel 
free to contact the Student Health and Counseling Centre at (807) 343-8361 (Prettie Residence). 
A list of additional local/community resources is provided at the end of this information letter.  
Questions about the Study 
 
If you have any questions about the research now or at a later time, please contact Flavia Spiroiu, 
H.B.A., Graduate Student, Department of Psychology, Lakehead University, 416-732-3911. You 
may also contact Dr. Amanda Maranzan, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, 
Lakehead University, (807) 343-8322. If you would like any information about the results of the 
study once it is completed, please contact Flavia Spiroiu. Alternatively, you are welcome to 
attend the researcher’s thesis defense.    
 
This pilot session has been reviewed and approved by the Lakehead University Research Ethics 
Board. If you have any questions related to the ethics of the research and would like to speak to 
someone outside of the research team, please contact Sue Wright at the Research Ethics Board at 
807-343-8283 or research@lakeheadu.ca. 
 




Flavia Spiroiu   Dr. Amanda Maranzan  
fspiroiu@lakeheadu.ca  kamaranz@lakeheadu.ca  














MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES 
*please print this page for your reference* 
Lakehead University Resource 
Counseling Services 
Lakehead University 
955 Oliver Road 






Good2Talk is a free, confidential helpline providing professional counselling and information 
and referrals for mental health, addictions and well-being to post-secondary students in Ontario, 
24/7/365. 
 
Thunder Bay Crisis Response Service 
(807) 346-8282 
Mental health workers provide support 24 hours a day and can help you to access further 
services, as needed 
 
Thunder Bay Counselling Centre 
(807) 684-1880 
Mental health workers provide counselling to individuals, couples, and families 
 




Mental Health Assessment Team 
At the Emergency Department (Thunder Bay Regional Health Sciences Centre) 
Mental health workers will assess your emergency mental health needs 
 
Thunder Bay Sexual Assault/Abuse Crisis Service 
(807) 344-4502 
Crisis workers are available 24 hours to give immediate help, as well as follow-up counseling, 
court advocacy and other services. Phone support for women who have experienced current ot 
past assault or abuse. 
 
Walk-in Counselling Services –Wednesdays from 12 noon to 8 pm 
-1st & 3rd Wednesday each month at –Thunder Bay Counselling Centre – 544 Winnipeg Avenue 










Appendix C: Participant Consent Agreement - Pilot Session 
 
By consenting to participate in this research, I indicate that I have read the 
“Participant Information Letter” and I have had the opportunity to receive satisfactory answers 
from the researchers concerning any questions that I might have about my participation in the 
Pilot Session of the Affective Picture Rating Task. I understand and agree to the following: 
 
 I understand all of the information in the “Information Letter.” 
 I am a volunteer and can withdraw at any time from this session without penalty or 
consequence. 
 There are no anticipated physical risks associated with participation in this session. 
Should I experience any personal distress or discomfort during or following my 
participation, I know that I may personally contact the Health and Counselling Centre at 
Lakehead University (Thunder Bay campus) to speak to a mental health professional, 
and/or utilize the list of community resources provided to me. 
 My personal information will be securely stored in the Mental Health Research Lab at 
Lakehead University for 5 years as per University regulations. 
 My personal information will remain anonymous should any publications or public 
presentations come out of this project. 
 I may receive a summary of this research upon completion if I so request. 
 I give my permission to be contacted by telephone and/or email for the purpose of 
participation in this session. 
 









________________________________________________            __________________ 




________________________________________________            __________________ 








Appendix D: Recruitment Mass Email - Study 
 
Dear Prospective Participant, 
 
My name is Flavia Spiroiu and I am a graduate student working with Dr. Amanda Maranzan in 
the Department of Psychology. We are seeking students to participate in a research study entitled 
“Interpreting Social Information: The Role of Uncertainty and Cognitive Processing Styles.” The 
purpose of this study is to examine the role of uncertainty and other cognitive-emotional 
processing variables (e.g., fear of negative evaluation) in the perception and interpretation of 
social information/situations. 
  
If you choose to participate in the study, you will be invited to complete two sessions: 
Part 1 (Online): Complete a package of online questionnaires regarding uncertainty and your 
thoughts, emotions, and behaviours in a variety of social contexts. Session 1 will take 
approximately 30-45 minutes. You will receive 1 bonus point toward your grade and one entry 
into a draw to win a $50 (CAD) Visa gift card. 
  
Part 2 (In Lab): Visit the Mental Health Research Lab located in the Lakehead University 
Psychology department for a one-hour session. During the lab session, you will be asked to read 
a short vignette depicting a meeting between two university students. After you have read the 
vignette, you will complete a brief questionnaire asking about your interpretation of events that 
were presented in the story. You will then complete a questionnaire that examines the ways in 
which different people perceive various social scenarios. Finally, you will complete a 
computerized affective picture rating task (APRT) in which you will rate the pleasantness of 
various images depicting social stimuli. In return for your participation in Part 2, you will receive 
1.25 bonus points and 1 entry into a draw to win a $100 (CAD) Visa gift card. 
  
Should you be interested, please click on the following link to read more information about the 
study and complete Part 1: https://lupsych.sona-
systems.com/default.aspx?p_return_experiment_id=143. You will then be redirected to the Sona 
system where you may select a time slot of your choice for Part 2. 
  
Your participation is extremely valuable to us and we look forward to 
your involvement! Sincerely, 
  
Flavia Spiroiu                          Dr. Amanda Maranzan 
fspiroiu@lakeheadu.ca           kamaranz@lakeheadu.ca 














Appendix F: Study Description on SONA Online Management System 
 
Part 1: Interpreting Social Information: The Role of Uncertainty and Cognitive Processing 
Styles  
 
This study aims to examine the role of uncertainty and other cognitive-emotional processing 
variables (e.g., fear of negative evaluation) in the perception and interpretation of social 
information and situations. It constitutes part 1 of a two-part investigation. During this study 
(session 1), you will complete online questionnaires regarding uncertainty and your thoughts, 
emotions, and behaviors in a variety of social contexts. Session 1 will take approximately 45 
minutes. You will receive 1 bonus point toward your grade in an eligible Psychology course and 
1 entry into a draw to win a $50 (CAD) Visa gift card. Given that our study is a 2 part study, we 
kindly ask that you do not sign up for part 1 only. Please sign up for session 2 (laboratory visit) 
on SONA as soon as you have completed part 1. COMPLETION OF BOTH PARTS IS VERY 
IMPORTANT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN VALID AND MEANINGFUL RESULTS. 
 
Part 2: Interpreting Social Information: The Role of Uncertainty and Cognitive Processing 
Styles  
 
This study aims to examine the role of uncertainty and other cognitive-emotional processing 
variables (e.g., fear of negative evaluation) in the perception and interpretation of social 
information and situations. During the laboratory visit, you will be asked to read a short vignette 
depicting a meeting between two university students. After you have read the vignette, you will 
complete a brief questionnaire asking about your interpretation of events that were presented in 
the story. You will then complete a questionnaire that examines the ways in which different 
people look at various social scenarios. Finally, you will complete a computerized affective 
picture rating task (APRT) in which you will rate the pleasantness of various images depicting 
social stimuli. In return for your participation in Session 2, you will receive 1.25 bonus points 
and 1 entry into a draw to win a $100 (CAD) Visa gift card. COMPLETION OF BOTH PARTS 

















Appendix G: Participant Information Letter - Study 
 
Dear Prospective Participant,  
 
You are kindly invited to participate in the research study "Interpreting Social Information: The 
Role of Uncertainty and Cognitive Processing Styles." The purpose of the study is to to examine 
the influence of uncertainty and other cognitive-emotional processing variables (e.g., fear of 
negative evaluation) in the perception and interpretation of social information and situations. The 
research is being conducted by Flavia Spiroiu (MA student) under the supervision of Dr. 
Amanda Maranzan (Psychology professor). If you choose to participate in this study, it is 
important that you read the following information.  
 
Description of the Study 
 
The study will consist of two (2) parts. During part one, you will first be asked to provide your 
name and email. This information will be used to connect your responses from part one with 
your responses from part two of the study. You will then complete a package of online 
questionnaires regarding uncertainty and your thoughts, emotions, and behaviors in a variety of 
social contexts. Session one will take approximately 45 minutes. By participating in Part one of 
this study, you will receive 1 bonus point toward your grade in an eligible Psychology course 
and 1 entry into a draw to win a $50 (CAD) Visa gift card. After you complete the online 
questionnaires, you may select a time to visit the laboratory in the Department of Psychology for 
the second portion of the study, which will take approximately 1 hour of your time. 
 
During the laboratory visit (part two), you will be asked to read a short vignette depicting a 
meeting between two university students. After you have read the vignette, you will complete a 
brief questionnaire asking about your interpretation of events that were presented in the story. 
You will then complete a questionnaire that examines the ways in which different people look at 
various social scenarios. Finally, you will complete a computerized affective picture rating task 
(APRT) in which you will rate the pleasantness of various images depicting social stimuli. In 
return for your participation in Part two, you will receive 1.25 bonus points and 1 entry into a 
draw to win a $100 (CAD) Visa gift card. 
 
Potential Risks or Discomforts 
 
There is minimal risk involved if you agree to participate in this study. You understand that you 
may experience some negative or unpleasant emotions when completing the questionnaires. You 
have the right to refuse or discontinue participation at any time. If you decide to stop 








Potential Benefits of the Study to You or Others 
 
It is possible that you will not receive any direct benefits from participating in this study, other 
than the course credits mentioned above. However, you may derive benefit from the self-
assessments, as they may increase your awareness of your thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. 
You may also develop a better understanding of research methodology, and your participation 




To ensure your anonymity, your data will be assigned a number at the beginning of the session 
and all of the data for you will be coded under this number. Thus, all questionnaire responses and 
all computer files that contain the data you generate during the study will be associated with the 
assigned number and not with your identity. The informed consent agreement and all data that 
identifies you will be stored in a locked storage space in the Mental Health Research Lab. The 
researcher conducting the study and the supervisor will be the sole individuals with access to the 
collected data. The data will be retained for 5 years, after which point it will be destroyed by 
secure and confidential disposal. Consent forms will be locked up separately from any 
identifying information. Only group findings will be reported in publications and presentations 
arising from this research.  
 
Data for Session 1 will be collected using Survey Monkey. Survey Monkey is a websurvey 
company based in the United States, and data will be stored on secure servers in the USA. Please 
note that Survey Monkey is hosted by a server located in the USA. The US Patriot Act permits 
U.S. law enforcement officials, for the purpose of anti-terrorism investigation, to seek a court 
order that allows access to the personal records of any person without the person's 
knowledge.  In view of this we cannot absolutely guarantee the full confidentiality and 
anonymity of your data.  With your consent to participant in this study, you acknowledge 




In return for your participation and efforts in both components of this research project, you will 
receive 2 bonus points towards you grade in an undergraduate course that is eligible for bonus 
points.  
Voluntary Nature of Participation 
Participation in this study is voluntary. Your choice of whether or not to participate will not 
influence your future relations with Lakehead University. If you decide to participate, you are 
free to withdraw your consent and to stop your participation at any time without any penalty. 
Your right to withdraw your consent also applies to our use of your data. Should you decide that 
you do not want us to retain or analyze data that you have provided during the course of your 
participation in this study, please feel free to notify us. At any point during the study, you may 
refuse to answer any question or stop participation altogether. If at any point during or after this 
study you would like to speak to a mental health professional, feel free to contact the Student 




Health and Counseling Centre at (807) 343-8361 (Prettie Res). A list of additional 
local/community resources is provided at the end of this information letter.  
Questions about the Study 
 
If you have any questions about the research now or at a later time, please contact Flavia Spiroiu, 
H.B.A., Graduate Student, Department of Psychology, Lakehead University, 416-732-3911. You 
may also contact Dr. Amanda Maranzan, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Lakehead 
University, (807) 343-8322.   
This research study has been reviewed and approved by the Lakehead University Research 
Ethics Board. If you have any questions related to the ethics of the research and would like to 
speak to someone outside of the research team, please contact Sue Wright at the Research Ethics 
Board at 807-343-8283 or research@lakeheadu.ca. 
 




Flavia Spiroiu   Dr. Amanda Maranzan  
fspiroiu@lakeheadu.ca  kamaranz@lakeheadu.ca  














MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES 
*please print this page for your reference* 
Lakehead University Resource 
Counseling Services 
Lakehead University 
955 Oliver Road 






Good2Talk is a free, confidential helpline providing professional counselling and information 
and referrals for mental health, addictions and well-being to post-secondary students in Ontario, 
24/7/365. 
 
Thunder Bay Crisis Response Service 
(807) 346-8282 
Mental health workers provide support 24 hours a day and can help you to access further 
services, as needed 
 
Thunder Bay Counselling Centre 
(807) 684-1880 
Mental health workers provide counselling to individuals, couples, and families 
 




Mental Health Assessment Team 
At the Emergency Department (Thunder Bay Regional Health Sciences Centre) 
Mental health workers will assess your emergency mental health needs 
 
Thunder Bay Sexual Assault/Abuse Crisis Service 
(807) 344-4502 
Crisis workers are available 24 hours to give immediate help, as well as follow-up counseling, 
court advocacy and other services. Phone support for women who have experienced current ot 
past assault or abuse. 
 
Walk-in Counselling Services –Wednesdays from 12 noon to 8 pm 
-1st & 3rd Wednesday each month at –Thunder Bay Counselling Centre – 544 Winnipeg Avenue 
-2nd & 4th Wednesday each month at Children’s Centre Thunder Bay – 283 Lisgar Street 
 
 




Appendix H: Participant Consent Agreement - Study 
 
By consenting to participate in this research, I indicate that I have read the 
“Participant Information Letter” and that I have had the opportunity to receive satisfactory 
answers from the researchers concerning any questions that I might have about my participation 
in Interpreting Social Information: The Role of Uncertainty and Cognitive Processing 
Styles. I understand and agree to the following: 
 
 I understand all of the information in the “Information Letter.” 
 I am a volunteer and can withdraw at any time from this study without penalty or 
consequence. 
 I may choose not to answer any question asked in this online questionnaire without 
penalty or consequence. 
 There are no anticipated physical risks associated with participation in this study. Should 
I experience any personal distress or discomfort during or following my participation, I 
know that I may personally contact the Health and Counselling Centre at Lakehead 
University (Thunder Bay campus) to speak to a mental health professional, and/or utilize 
the list of community resources provided to me. 
 My personal information will be securely stored in the Mental Health Research Lab at 
Lakehead University for 5 years as per University regulations. 
 My personal information will remain anonymous should any publications or public 
presentations come out of this project. 
 I may receive a summary of this research upon completion if I so request. 
 I give my permission to be contacted by telephone and/or email for the purpose of 
participation in this study. 
 









________________________________________________            __________________ 




________________________________________________            __________________ 
Signature of Experimenter who Obtained Informed Consent   Date 




Appendix I: Debriefing Form 
 
Purpose of the Study: Research has indicated that individuals who experience social anxiety 
exhibit higher levels of intolerance of uncertainty, a cognitive bias involved in the perception and 
interpretation of uncertain situations. The purpose of this study is to investigate the cognitive 
mechanisms through which intolerance of uncertainty might lead to the development and 
maintenance of social anxiety. More specifically, it examines the possibility that intolerance of 
uncertainty may contribute to selective processing and negative interpretations of ambiguous 
social cues and situations, which may in turn evoke and/or maintain feelings of social anxiety.       
 
This study will therefore elucidate the role of intolerance of uncertainty about ambiguous social 
information in specific information processing biases associated with social anxiety. In doing so, 
it will contribute to our understanding of interpretative processes as they specifically relate to 
intolerance of uncertainty and anxiety in interpersonal and performance situations. Knowledge 
about these factors can, in turn, lead to improvements in psychological treatments for social 
anxiety.  
 
Resources: We provide everyone who completes this study with the same list of resources in 
case they are interested in learning more about social anxiety. Our list of resources contains titles 
of books about the management of social anxiety, as well as referral sources (please turn over 
this page for the list).  
 
Contact Information: If you have any questions or concerns about this experiment or your 
participation in this study, you may contact: 
Flavia Spiroiu, HBA     Amanda Maranzan, PhD             Susan Wright 
Main Study Investigator     MA Study Supervisor              Research Ethics Officer 
Department of Psychology    Department of Psychology             Office of Research Services 
Lakehead University     Lakehead University              Lakehead University 
955 Oliver Road     955 Oliver Road              1294 Balmoral St., NO 2011C  
Thunder Bay, ON P7B 5E1    Thunder Bay, ON P7B 5E1             Thunder Bay, ON P7B 5Z5 
(416) 732-3911      (807) 343-8322              (807) 343-8283 
fspiroiu@lakeheadu.ca                 kamaranz@lakeheadu.ca              research@lakeheadu.ca  
 
If you would like any information about the results of the study once it is completed, please 
contact Flavia Spiroiu.  
 
A note about disclosure: In order to maintain the integrity of this research, we ask that you not 
disclose the purpose of this experiment to others who may be interested in taking part in this 
study. When participants possess too much prior knowledge about the purpose of an experiment, 
it can affect how they behave in the experiment and may consequently render the data for that 
individual unusable. 
 
Thank you very much for participating in this study! 
 




Self-Help Books for Social Anxiety 
 
Antony, M. M. (2004). 10 simple solutions to shyness: How to overcome shyness, social anxiety, 
and fear of public speaking. Oakland, CA: New Harbinger. 
 
Antony, M. M., & Swinson, R. P. (2008). The shyness and social anxiety workbook: Proven, 
step-by-step techniques for overcoming your fear (2nd ed.). Oakland, CA: New Harbinger. 
 
Butler, G. (2008). Overcoming social anxiety and shyness: A self-help guide using cognitive 
behavioral techniques. New York: Basic Books.  
 
Hope, D. A., Heimberg, R. G., & Turk, C. L. (2010). Managing social anxiety: A cognitive-
behavioral therapy approach (2nd ed., workbook). New York: Oxford University Press. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Lakehead University Resource 
Counseling Services 
Lakehead University 
955 Oliver Road 






Good2Talk is a free, confidential helpline providing professional counselling and information 
and referrals for mental health, addictions and well-being to post-secondary students in Ontario, 
24/7/365. 
 
Thunder Bay Crisis Response Service 
(807) 346-8282 
Mental health workers provide support 24 hours a day and can help you to access further 
services, as needed 
 
Thunder Bay Counselling Centre 
(807) 684-1880 
Mental health workers provide counselling to individuals, couples, and families 
 










Mental Health Assessment Team 
At the Emergency Department (Thunder Bay Regional Health Sciences Centre) 
Mental health workers will assess your emergency mental health needs 
 
Thunder Bay Sexual Assault/Abuse Crisis Service 
(807) 344-4502 
Crisis workers are available 24 hours to give immediate help, as well as follow-up counseling, 
court advocacy and other services. Phone support for women who have experienced current ot 
past assault or abuse. 
 
Walk-in Counselling Services –Wednesdays from 12 noon to 8 pm 
-1st & 3rd Wednesday each month at –Thunder Bay Counselling Centre – 544 Winnipeg Avenue 






































Appendix J: Demographic Questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following questions listed below by writing your response or checking the 
most appropriate answer.  
 
1. What is your age? ____ 
 
2. What is your biological sex? 
Female □ 
Male  □ 
Other  □ 
 
3. Which gender do you most closely identify with? 
Female □ Gender variant/non-conforming  □ 
Male   □ Other          □ 
Transgender    □ Prefer not to answer       □ 
 
4. Which ethnicity do you most closely identify with? 
White/Caucasian   □ 
Asian      □ 
Black/African Canadian   □ 
First Nations    □ 
Other      □ Please specify ___________________ 
 
5. What is your current level of education? (Please choose one) 
University Year 1  □ 
University Year 2  □ 
University Year 3  □ 
University Year 4  □ 
University Year 5 (or more) □ 
 
6. Are you completing your Psychology:  
 Major   □  
 Minor  □ 
 Neither □ 
 Undecided □ 
 
7. What is your occupational status? (Please check all that apply) 
Full time Student □ Part time Student □ Full time Employee □ 
Part time Employee  □ Unemployed  □ Other: _________________ 
 
8. What is your marital status? 
Married        □ Separated  □ Divorced  □ 
Cohabitating  □ Single   □ Widowed □ 
 
 




Appendix K: Anxiety Sensitivity Index - 3 (ASI-3) 
Taylor, Cox, Deacon, Heimberg, Ledley, et al., 2007; ASI; Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 
1986 
 
Please choose the number that best corresponds to how much you agree with each item. If any 
items concern something that you have never experienced (e.g., fainting in public), then answer 
on the basis of how you think you might feel if you had such an experience. Otherwise, answer 
all items on the basis of your own experience. Be careful to choose only one number for each 




little Some Much 
Very 
much 
1. It is important for me not to appear nervous.  0 1 2 3 4 
2. When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I 
worry that I might be going crazy. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
3. It scares me when my heart beats rapidly.  0 1 2 3 4 
4. When my stomach is upset, I worry that I 
might be seriously ill. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5. It scares me when I am unable to keep my 
mind on a task. 
0 1 2 3 4 
6. When I tremble in the presence of others,  
 I fear what people might think of me.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
7. When my chest feels tight, I get scared that I 
won’t be able to breathe properly.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
8. When I feel pain in my chest, I worry that 
I’m going to have a heart attack.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
9. I worry that other people will notice my 
anxiety.  
0 1 2 3 4 
10. When I feel “spacey” or spaced out I worry 
that I may be mentally ill.  
0 1 2 3 4 
11. It scares me when I blush in front of people.  0 1 2 3 4 
12. When I notice my heart skipping a beat, I 
worry that there is something seriously 
wrong with me.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
13. When I begin to sweat in a social situation,  
 I fear people will think negatively of me.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
14. When my thoughts seem to speed up, I 
worry that I might be going crazy.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
15. When my throat feels tight, I worry that I 
could choke to death.  
0 1 2 3 4 
16. When I have trouble thinking clearly, I 
worry that there is something wrong with 
me.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
17. I think it would be horrible for me to faint in 
public.  
0 1 2 3 4 
18. When my mind goes blank, I worry there is 
something terribly wrong with me.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 




Appendix L: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS)  
Mattick & Clarke (1998) 
 
Instructions: For each item, please circle the number to indicate the degree to which you feel the 
statement is characteristic or true for you. The rating scale is as follows: 
 
0 =  Not at all characteristic or true of me. 
1 =  Slightly characteristic or true of me. 
2 =  Moderately characteristic or true of me. 
3 =  Very characteristic or true of me. 
4 =  Extremely characteristic or true of me. 
 
Characteristic Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
1. I get nervous if I have to speak with 
someone in authority (teacher, 
boss, etc.). 
0 1 2 3 4 
2. I have difficulty making eye contact 
with others. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
3. I become tense if I have to talk 
about myself or my feelings. 
0 1 2 3 4 
4. I find it difficult to mix comfortably 
with the people I work with. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5. I find it easy to make friends my 
own age. 
0 1 2 3 4 
6. I tense up if I meet an acquaintance 
in the street. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
7. When mixing socially, I am 
uncomfortable. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
8. I feel tense if I am alone with just 
one other person. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
9. I am at ease meeting people at 
parties, etc. 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. I have difficulty talking with other 
people. 
0 1 2 3 4 
11. I find it easy to think of things to 
talk about. 
0 1 2 3 4 
12. I worry about expressing myself in 
case I appear awkward. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
13. I find it difficult to disagree with 
another’s point of view. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
14. I have difficulty talking to 
attractive persons of the opposite 
sex. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
15. I find myself worrying that I 
won’t know what to say in social 
situations. 
0 1 2 3 4 







































Characteristic Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
16. I am nervous mixing with people I 
don’t know well. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
17. I feel I’ll say something      
embarrassing when talking. 
0 1 2 3 4 
18. When mixing in a group, I find   
myself worrying I will be 
ignored. 
0 1 2 3 4 
19. I am tense mixing in a group. 0 1 2 3 4 
20. I am unsure whether to greet 
someone I know only slightly. 
0 1 2 3 4 




Appendix M: Social Phobia Scale (SPS)  
Mattick & Clarke (1998) 
 
Instructions: For each item, please circle the number to indicate the degree to which you feel the 
statement is characteristic or true for you. The rating scale is as follows: 
 
0 =  Not at all characteristic or true of me. 
1 =  Slightly characteristic or true of me. 
2 =  Moderately characteristic or true of me. 
3 =  Very characteristic or true of me. 
4 =  Extremely characteristic or true of me. 
 
Characteristic Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
1.  I become anxious if I have to write 
in front of people. 
0 1 2 3 4 
2.  I become self-conscious when 
using public toilets. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
3.  I can suddenly become aware of 
my own voice and of others 
listening to me. 
0 1 2 3 4 
4.  I get nervous that people are 
staring at me as I walk down the 
street. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5.  I fear I may blush when I am with 
others. 
0 1 2 3 4 
6.  I feel self-conscious if I have to 
enter a room where others are 
already seated. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
7.  I worry about shaking or trembling 
when I’m watched by other people. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
8.  I would get tense if I had to sit 
facing other people on a bus or 
train.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
9.  I get panicky that others might see 
me faint or be sick or ill. 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. I would find it difficult to drink 
something in a group of people. 
0 1 2 3 4 
11. It would make me feel self-
conscious to eat in front of a 
stranger in a restaurant.  
0 1 2 3 4 
12. I am worried people will think my 
behavior is odd. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
13. I would get tense if I had to carry 
a tray across a crowded cafeteria. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
14. I worry I’ll lose control of myself 
in front of other people. 
0 1 2 3 4 




































Characteristic Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
15. I worry I might do something to 
attract the attention of other 
people.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
16. When in an elevator, I am tense if 
people look at me. 
0 1 2 3 4 
17. I can feel conspicuous standing in 
a line. 
0 1 2 3 4 
18. I can get tense when I speak in   
front of other people. 
0 1 2 3 4 
19. I worry my head will shake or nod 
in front of others. 
     
20. I feel awkward and tense if I know 
people are watching me. 
0 1 2 3 4 




Appendix N: Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) 
Freeston, M. H., Rhéaume, J., Letarte, H., Dugas, M. J., & Ladouceur, R. (1994) 
 
Please choose the number that best corresponds to how much you agree with each item. 
 Not at all 








Very    
representative        
of me 
Entirely          
representative                   
of me 
1.  Uncertainty stops me    
from having a strong 
opinion. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2.  Being uncertain means 
that a person is 
disorganized. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.  Uncertainty makes life    
intolerable. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.  It's unfair having no 
guarantees in life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.  My mind can't be 
relaxed if I don't know 
what will happen 
tomorrow. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6.  Uncertainty makes me 
uneasy, anxious or 
stressed. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7.  Unforeseen events 
upset me greatly. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8.  It frustrates me not 
having all the 
information I need. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9.  Uncertainty keeps me   
from living a full life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. One should always 
look ahead so as to 
avoid surprises. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. A small unforeseen 
event can spoil 
everything, even with 
the best of planning. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. When it's time to act, 
uncertainty paralyzes 
me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Being uncertain means 
that I am not first rate. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. When I am uncertain, I 
can't go forward. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 




 Not at all 








Very    
representative        
of me 
Entirely          
representative                   
of me 
15. When I am uncertain I 
can't function very 
well. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Unlike me, others 
seem to know where 
they are going with 
their lives 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Uncertainty makes me 
vulnerable, unhappy or 
sad. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. I always want to know 
what the future has in 
store for me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. I can't stand being 
taken by surprise. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. The smallest doubt can 
stop me from acting. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. I should be able to 
organize everything in 
advance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. Being uncertain means 
that I lack confidence. 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. I think it's unfair that 
other people seem to be 
sure about their future. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Uncertainty stops me 
from sleeping soundly. 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. I must get away from 
all uncertain situations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
26. The ambiguities in life   
stress me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. I can't stand being 
undecided about my 
future. 















Appendix O: Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation – II (BFNE-II) 
Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 2007 
 
Please choose the number that best corresponds to how much you agree with each item. 
 Not at all 








Very    
characteristic        
of me 
Entirely          
characteristic                   
of me 
1.  I worry about what    
other people will think 
of me even when I 
know it doesn't make 
any difference. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. It bothers me when 
people form an 
unfavourable 
impression of me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I am frequently afraid of 
other people noticing 
my shortcomings. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I worry about what kind 
of impression I make 
on people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I am afraid that others   
will not approve of me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I am afraid that other 
people will find fault 
with me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I am concerned about 
other people's opinions 
of me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. When I am talking to 
someone, I worry about 
what they may be 
thinking about me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I am usually worried 
about what kind of 
impression I make. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. If I know someone is 
judging me, it tends to 
bother me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Sometimes I think I am 
too concerned with 
what other people think 
of me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I often worry that I 
will say or do wrong 
things. 
1 2 3 4 5 




Appendix P: Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale - 21 (DASS-21) 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995 
 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the 
statement applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend 
too much time on any statement. The rating scale is as follows: 
0 Did not apply to me at all - NEVER 
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time - SOMETIMES 
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time - OFTEN 





 Never Sometimes Often Almost Always 
1. I found it hard to wind down. 0 1 2 3 
2. I was aware of dryness of my mouth. 0 1 2 3 
3. I couldn’t seem to experience any positive 
feeling at all.  
0 1 2 3 
4. I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., 
excessively rapid breathing, breathlessness in 
the absence of physical exertion) 
0 1 2 3 
5. I found it difficult to work up the initiative to 
do things. 
0 1 2 3 
6. I tended to over-react to situations. 0 1 2 3 
7. I experienced trembling (e.g., in the hands) 0 1 2 3 
8. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy. 0 1 2 3 
9. I was worried about situations in which I might 
panic and make a fool of myself. 
0 1 2 3 
10. I felt that I had nothing to look forward to. 0 1 2 3 
11. I found myself getting agitated. 0 1 2 3 
12. I found it difficult to relax.  0 1 2 3 
13. I felt down-hearted and blue. 0 1 2 3 
14. I was intolerant of anything that kept me from 
getting on with what I was doing. 
0 1 2 
 
3 
15. I felt I was close to panic. 0 1 2 3 
16. I was unable to become enthusiastic about 
anything. 
0 1 2 
 
3 
17. I felt I wasn’t worth much as a person. 0 1 2 3 
18. I felt that I was rather touchy. 0 1 2 3 
19. I was aware of the action of my heart in the 
absence of physical exertion (e.g., sense of 
heart rate increase, heart missing a beat). 
0 1 2 3 
20. I felt scared without any good reason. 0 1 2 3 
21. I felt that life was meaningless. 0 1 2 3 




Appendix Q: Ambiguous Social Vignette I 
Constans, Penn, Ihen, & Hope (1999) 
 
 Steve had a blind date that evening.  So, after class, he went to the bar where they 
decided to meet.  As he entered the bar, he saw a young woman sitting alone having a drink.  He 
knew that this was her; she was wearing the dress she had described over the phone.  Steve 
approached the table, tapped her on the shoulder and asked "Pardon me, but are you Lisa?"  She 
turned to him and replied "Yes, you must be Steve."  As he was sitting down, she added "You're 
certainly not what I expected."  They then had a drink together.  At the bar, they began to get 
acquainted with one another.  For example, they talked about where they grew up, what kind of 
music they liked, and what they were majoring in.  After a half hour of chatting, Steve suggested 
that they go to the restaurant for dinner.  Steve had told Lisa that he had a favorite restaurant that 
he really wanted her to try. 
 As they entered the restaurant, Lisa turned to Steve and said "This is an unusual place."  
The waiter then led them to their table.  Steve had requested this table in advance, as he thought 
its location was especially intimate.  When he shared this with Lisa, she replied "Hmmm, I had a 
feeling you might have chosen this table."  They began the dinner by ordering a couple of 
appetizers and drinks.  About twenty minutes later, the waiter approached asking if they had 
decided upon their dinner selection and a bottle of wine.  After choosing her entree, Lisa asked 
Steve if he wouldn't mind ordering the wine.  Steve agreed, scanned the wine list and made his 
selection.  After what appeared to be a moment or two pause, the waiter looked at Steve and 
asked "So, you would like a bottle of the '89 Chardonnay?"  Steve replied "Yes" and the waiter 
walked away. 
 During dinner, they found that they had mutual interests in traveling.  Both had been to 
Europe in high school and had enjoyed it thoroughly.  In fact, both spoke a foreign language:  
Steve spoke Spanish, while Lisa spoke Italian.  They spent some time discussing where in the 
U.S. they had visited and where they would like to go in the future.  Steve thought that the dinner 
was at its usual high standard of quality.  He was also pleased with his wine selection, especially 
when Lisa, after taking her initial sip, looked at him and said with a slightly perceptible smile 
"You certainly know how to pick wine." 
 Following the dinner, Steve asked Lisa if she wanted to go to his favorite place for coffee 
and dessert.  Lisa replied "Since you chose for the dinner, how about I choose for desert?"  This 
was okay with Steve, especially since he wanted to make a good impression.  So, they went to a 
coffee place she knew of and chatted about their university.  Towards the end of the coffee, Lisa 
told Steve that she had to make a phone call to a girlfriend who was having a birthday party.  
When she returned, they finished their coffee and decided to walk home.  As they were walking, 
Lisa pointed towards an apartment building where her friend's birthday was being held.  As they 
approached it, Lisa turned to Steve and said "If you don't mind, I'd really like to stop by the 
party.  Joan is my best friend and today is her birthday.  When I called before, I was checking to 
see if the party would be going on late.  Anyway, it is still going on and I really shouldn't miss 
it."  There was a second or two of silence before Lisa added "The people at the party are 
probably a different sort of crowd than you're used to.  But, I'm sure if you went you'd have a 
pretty good time.  I don't think Joan would mind." 
 Upon arriving there, Joan greeted them both and, while glancing at Steve, appeared to 
whisper something into Lisa's ear.  The party actually turned out to be pretty good.  Lisa seemed 
to feel quite at home and was having a good time.  She introduced Steve to some of her friends 




who appeared to be fairly friendly.  Steve even ran into a couple of people with whom he had 
classes.  After some time, Steve and Lisa decided to leave.  He walked Lisa to her house, where 
they stood outside and chatted a bit more.  After a while, Lisa smiled and said "Well it's getting 
late.  I better go in.  Thanks for the evening."  They talked a few minutes more, before Lisa 














































Appendix R: Ambiguous Social Vignette Judgment Questionnaire I 






Below are questions based on the story you just read.  Some of these questions are multiple 
choice. Other questions require you to make a rating on a 1-7 scale.  Please answer all items. 
 
01) Lisa seemed to like Steve. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 
       Disagree                                  Agree 
 
02) Lisa would go out again with Steve. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 
       Disagree                                  Agree 
 
03) Steve probably felt that the date went: 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          Very                           Neutral           Very 
          Poorly              Well 
 
04) What are the chances that Steve and Lisa will go out again? 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          Very                          Neutral           Very 
          Low              High 
 
05) Steve had a date with: 
  a. Girlfriend   c. An acquaintance 
  b. Someone he didn't know d. An old girlfriend 
 
06) They agreed in advance that Steve would choose the restaurant. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        Strongly                      Neutral         Strongly 








07) When Lisa said to Steve, "You're not what I expected", she  was impressed. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 
       Disagree                                  Agree 
 
08) Steve requested the table at the restaurant in advance because he thought it 
  a. Had the best view  c. Would bring him luck 
  b. Was especially intimate d. Brought back memories 
 
09) Which one of these topics was not brought up at all during the entire date? 
  a. Music    c. Travel 
  b. Family    d. The university 
 
10) Lisa had a positive first impression of the restaurant. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 
       Disagree                                  Agree 
 
11) Lisa did not like the wine that Steve ordered. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 
       Disagree                                  Agree 
 
12) At the coffee shop, Lisa made a telephone call to her: 
 
  a. Mother   c. Friend 
  b. Roommate   d. Sorority sister 
 
13) If Lisa was having a really good time on the date, she wouldn't have gone to the party. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 
       Disagree                                  Agree 
 
14) Lisa wanted Steve to go to the party with her. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 









15) Lisa's friend Joan appeared to be impressed with Steve 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 
      Disagree                                  Agree 
 
16) Steve had a good time at the party 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 
       Disagree                                  Agree 
 
17) At the party, Lisa turned to Steve and said: 
 
  a. I'm glad you came here c. Are you having a good time? 
  b. Didn't I tell you that   d. None of the above 
   this was a different 
   sort of crowd? 
 
18) Who decided to leave the party? 
  a. Steve    c. Both Steve and Lisa 
  b. Lisa    d. None of the above 
 
19) As they walked up to Lisa's house, she said to Steve: 
  a. Thanks for the evening, c. Thanks for the evening 
   let's do it again sometime 
  b. Thanks for the evening, d. Thanks for the evening. I 
   I had a good time   don't know, however, if   
         we should go out again.  
 
 
Subject #__________________   Date__________________ 
 

















Appendix S: Ambiguous Social Vignette II 
Constans, Penn, Ihen, & Hope (1999) 
 
Lisa had a blind date that evening.  So, after class, she went to the bar where they decided 
to meet.  As she entered the bar, she saw a young man sitting alone having a drink.  She knew 
that this was him; he was wearing the jacket he had described over the phone.  Lisa approached 
the table, tapped him on the shoulder and asked "Pardon me, but are you Steve?"  He turned to 
him and replied "Yes, you must be Lisa."  As she was sitting down, he added "You're certainly 
not what I expected."  They then had a drink together.  At the bar, they began to get acquainted 
with one another.  For example, they talked about where they grew up, what kind of music they 
liked, and what they were majoring in.  After a half hour of chatting, Lisa suggested that they go 
to the restaurant for dinner.  Lisa had told Steve over the phone that she had a favorite restaurant 
that she really wanted him to try. 
 As they entered the restaurant, Steve turned to Lisa and said "This is an unusual place."  
The waiter then led them to their table.  Lisa had requested this table in advance, as she thought 
its location was especially intimate.  When she shared this with Steve, he replied "Hmmm, I had 
a feeling you might have chosen this table."  They began the dinner by ordering a couple of 
appetizers and drinks.  About twenty minutes later, the waiter approached asking if they had 
decided upon their dinner selection and a bottle of wine.  After choosing his entree, Steve asked 
Lisa if she wouldn't mind ordering the wine.  Lisa agreed, scanned the wine list and made her 
selection.  After what appeared to be a moment or two pause, the waiter looked at Lisa and asked 
"So, you would like a bottle of the '89 Chardonnay?"  Lisa replied "Yes" and the waiter walked 
away. 
 During dinner, they found that they had mutual interests in traveling.  Both had been to 
Europe in high school and had enjoyed it thoroughly.  In fact, both spoke a foreign language:  
Steve spoke Spanish, while Lisa spoke Italian.  They spent some time discussing where in the 
U.S. they had visited and where they would like to go in the future.  Lisa thought that the dinner 
was at its usual high standard of quality.  She was also pleased with her wine selection, 
especially when Steve, after taking his initial sip, looked at her and said with a slightly 
perceptible smile "You certainly know how to pick wine." 
 Following the dinner, Lisa asked Steve if he wanted to go to her favorite place for coffee 
and dessert.  Steve replied "Since you chose for the dinner, how about I choose for desert?"  This 
was okay with Lisa, especially since she wanted to make a good impression.  So, they went to a 
coffee place he knew of and chatted about their university.  Towards the end of the coffee, Steve 
told Lisa that he had to make a phone call to a friend who was having a birthday party.  When he 
returned, they finished their coffee and decided to walk home.  As they were walking, Steve 
pointed towards an apartment building where his friend's birthday was being held.  As they 
approached it, Steve turned to Lisa and said "If you don't mind, I'd really like to stop by the 
party.  John is my best friend and today is his birthday.  When I called before, I was checking to 
see if the party would be going on late.  Anyway, it is still going on and I really shouldn't miss 
it."  There was a second or two of silence before Steve added "The people at the party are 
probably a different sort of crowd than you're used to.  But, I'm sure if you went you'd have a 
pretty good time.  I don't think John would mind." 
 Upon arriving there, John greeted them both and, while glancing at Lisa, appeared to 
whisper something into Steve's ear.  The party actually turned out to be pretty good.  Steve 
seemed to feel quite at home and was having a good time.  He introduced Lisa to some of his 




friends who appeared to be fairly friendly.  Lisa even ran into a couple of people with whom she 
had classes.  After some time, Steve and Lisa decided to leave.  He walked Lisa to her house, 
where they stood outside and chatted a bit more.  After a while, Steve then smiled and said "Well 
it's getting late.  I better going.  Thanks for the evening."  They talked a few minutes more, 














































Appendix T: Ambiguous Social Vignette Judgment Questionnaire II 






Below are questions based on the story you just read.  Some of these questions are multiple 
choice.  Other questions require you to make a rating on a 1-7 scale.  Please answer all items. 
 
01) Steve seemed to like Lisa. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        Strongly                      Neutral         Strongly 
        Disagree                                  Agree 
 
02) Steve would go out again with Lisa. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         Strongly                     Neutral         Strongly 
         Disagree                                  Agree 
 
03) Lisa probably felt that the date went: 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          Very                          Neutral           Very 
          Poorly              Well 
 
04) What are the chances that Lisa and Steve will go out again? 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          Very                          Neutral           Very 
          Low              High 
 
05) Lisa had a date with: 
  a. Boyfriend   c. An acquaintance 
  b. Someone she didn't know d. An old boyfriend 
 
06) They agreed in advance that Lisa would choose the restaurant. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 








07) When Steve said to Lisa, "You're not what I expected", he was impressed. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 
       Disagree                                  Agree 
 
08) Lisa requested the table at the restaurant in advance  because she thought it: 
  a. Had the best view  c. Would bring her luck 
  b. Was especially intimate d. Brought back memories 
 
09) Which one of these topics was not brought up at all during the entire date? 
  a. Music    c. Travel 
  b. Family    d. The university 
 
10) Steve had a positive first impression of the restaurant. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral        Strongly 
       Disagree                                 Agree 
 
11) Steve did not like the wine that Lisa ordered. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 
       Disagree                                  Agree 
 
12) At the coffee shop, Steve made a telephone call to his: 
 
  a. Father    c. Friend 
  b. Roommate   d. Fraternity brother 
 
13) If Steve was having a really good time on the date, he wouldn't have gone to the party. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 
       Disagree                                  Agree 
 
14) Steve wanted Lisa to go to the party with him. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 









15) Steve's friend John appeared to be impressed with Lisa 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 
       Disagree                                  Agree 
 
16)  Lisa had a good time at the party 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       Strongly                       Neutral         Strongly 
       Disagree                                  Agree 
 
17) At the party, Steve turned to Lisa and said: 
 
  a. I'm glad you came here c. Are you having a good time? 
  b. Didn't I tell you that  d. None of the above 
   this was a different 
   sort of crowd? 
 
18) Who decided to leave the party? 
  a. Steve    c. Both Steve and Lisa 
  b. Lisa    d. None of the above 
 
19) As they walked up to Lisa's house, he said to Lisa: 
  a. Thanks for the evening, c. Thanks for the evening 
   let's do it again sometime 
  b. Thanks for the evening, d. Thanks for the evening. I 
   I had a good time   don't know, however, if   
        we should go out again.  
 
 
Subject #____________________    Date_________________ 
 
Male/Female       Age__________________ 
 















Appendix U: Ambiguous Social Situations Interpretation Questionnaire  
Stopa & Clark, (2000) 
 
 
Here are some outline descriptions of situations in which it is not quite clear what is happening.  
Read each one, and then answer the question below it very briefly.  Write down the first thing 
that comes into your mind without thinking too long about it.  Please write down what you think 
is happening before you turn over the page.  Be as specific as possible. 
 
When you have done that, turn over the page and you will see three possible explanations for the 
situation.  Arrange these in the order in which they would be most likely to come to your mind if 
you found yourself in a similar situation.  So the one that you would consider most likely to be 
true should come first, and the one that you would consider least likely to be true should come 
third.  Do not think too long before deciding.  We want your first impressions, and do not worry 
if none of them fits with what you actually did think. 
 
  






























  1. a) You have appendicitis or an ulcer. 
 
   b) You have indigestion. 
 
c)     You are hungry. 
 
 




2. You ask a friend to go out for a meal with you in a couple of  















  2. a) They are trying to economize. 
 
b) They don’t want to spend the evening with you. 
 
c) They’ve already arranged to do something else. 
 
 




















  3. a) You have cancer. 
 
b) It’s normal fluctuation. 
 
c) You have been rushing about more than usual. 
 
 



















  4. a) They are bored with their job, and behave rudely. 
 
b) They are concentrating on something else. 
 
c) You are not important enough for them to bother with. 
 
 




















  5. a) You have been exerting yourself and are overtired. 
 
b) Something you ate disagreed with you. 
 
c) You are dangerously ill. 
 
 



















  6. a) He wants to make sure you have settled in alright. 
 
b) You haven’t been doing the job properly. 
 
c) He is going to tell you how well you have been doing. 
 
 




7. A letter marked “URGENT” arrives. 
 
What is in the letter? 
 
  










  7. a) It is a circular designed to attract your attention. 
 
b) You forgot to pay a bill. 
 























  8. a) You’ve said something amusing. 
 
b) You’re making a fool of yourself. 
 
c) They’re remembering a joke. 
 
 




9. You wake up with a start in the middle of the night, thinking you heard a 
noise, but all is quiet. 
 
What woke you up? 
 
  










  9. a) You were woken by a dream. 
 
b) A burglar broke into your house. 
 
c) A door or window rattled in the wind. 
 
 




















  10. a) They did not wish to outstay their welcome. 
 
b) They had another pressing engagement to go to. 
 
c) They were bored and did not enjoy the visit. 
 
 




11. You are having a conversation with some friends.  You say something and 















  11. a) You said something foolish. 
 
b) They are thinking about what you said. 
 
c) There was nothing more to say. 
 
 



















  12. a) They have had a serious accident on the way home. 
 
b) They met a friend and are talking with them. 
 
c) It took longer than usual to get home. 
 
 




13. You are in the middle of answering a question at an interview.  The 















  13. a) They were satisfied with your answer and wanted to  
move on to another question. 
 
b) They are bad interviewers. 
 
c) They thought that you were talking rubbish. 
 
 



















  14. a) You have indigestion. 
 
b) You have a sore muscle. 
 
c) Something is wrong with your heart. 
 
 




15. You join a group of colleagues for lunch at work.  As you sit down, two 















  15. a) They have got some work to finish. 
 
b) They don’t much like you. 
 
c) They have to go to the bank. 
 
 



















  16. a) He’s lost and wants directions. 
 
b) You have done something wrong and are about to be told off. 
 
c) He wants to ask some questions for a survey. 
 
 



















  17. a) You are developing flu. 
 
b) You are about to suffocate or stop breathing. 
 
c) You are physically “out of shape”. 
 
 



















  18. a) Something outside has caught their attention. 
 
b) They are bored with you. 
 
c) They are tired and can’t concentrate. 
 
 



















  19. a) They are criticizing you. 
 
b) They are being friendly and want you to join them. 
 
c) They just happen to be looking your way. 
 
 



















  20. a) You are about to faint. 
 
b) You need to get something to eat. 
 
c) You didn’t get enough sleep last night. 
 
 




21. You’ve made a tentative arrangement to go to the cinema with  















  21. a) They don’t feel well. 
 
b) You’ve done something to offend them. 
 
c) They’ve arranged something else by mistake and are too  
embarrassed to tell you. 
    
     




22. You are talking to someone at a party.  They excuse themselves  















  22. a) They are just being sociable. 
 
b) You are boring them. 
 
c) They saw someone whom they haven’t seen for a long time. 
 
 



















  23. a) You are going out of your mind. 
 
b) You are coming down with a cold. 
 
c) You’ve been working too hard and need a rest. 
 
 



















  24. a) Their guide said something amusing. 
 
b) You look odd. 
 
c) They’re enjoying their holiday. 
 
 
1st ………… 2nd ………… 3rd ………… 
 
  










Now you have answered the preceding questions, we would be grateful if you would answer one 
more question about each of the ambiguous situations.  Please return to the start of the booklet 
and then rate the extent to which you think each of the three explanations for a situation would 
be likely to be true if you found yourself in that situation. 
 
 
Use the scale below for your ratings.  Put a number between 0 and 8 next to each explanation in 
the text.  Do not worry if your ratings appear to be different from your previous answers, and 




       0----------1----------2----------3-----------4----------5----------6----------7----------8 

































































Appendix Y: Ambiguous Picture from the Social Anxiety Affective Picture Rating Task  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
